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alterum” and its Roots in the Legal Past of Europe
1. Introduction
Modern systems of law are familiar with the principle that one can be
obligated to a third person not being a party to the contract entered into.
Various legal concepts are nowadays recognized as achieving this. Firstly,
there is the cession of claims. Even without my consent, I can become bound
to a third person by the fact that my creditor assigns his claim against me to
this person. Moreover, I myself can have the desire to be obligated to a third
person. This can be realized in various ways through an intermediary, which
brings us to the remaining two possibilities. I can enter into a contract in
favour of a third person. In this case, the intermediary is party to the contract
entered into, although he stipulates that something is performed for an
absent beneficiary. The third possibility is agency. I can become bound
through an intermediary who acts as the direct representative of the third
person. In the latter case the intermediary himself will derive no right
whatsoever from the contract, only the third party will become my creditor.
These three modern concepts, i.e. cession, contract in favour of a third
party and agency, have one thing in common. They clash with the
fundamental rules of Roman law, firmly rooted in the Institutes of Justinian
(482-565). According to the Institutes, it is impossible to acquire rights
through an extraneus, i.e. an outsider, somebody who is not one’s slave or
one’s child under paternal control1. Moreover, it is impossible to stipulate that
something be given to another person, or as the Roman maxim reads alteri
* The authors would like to thank the Max Planck-Institut für europäische
Rechtsgeschichte (Frankfurt/M), where part of the investigation took place, Aniceto
Masferrer (University of Girona) for his advise and help, Guustaaf van Nifterik (Vrije
Universiteit Amsterdam) for his useful comment on the draft version of this paper, and
Margaret Hewett (University of Cape Town) for correcting the English of the text.
1 “Per extraneam personam nihil adquiri posse” (Inst. 2.9.5). This rule is similarly
phrased in Paul D. 45.1.126.2 and Diocl. C. 4.27.1pr. The context of the maxim in the
Codex indicates that it is not only impossible to acquire real rights, but that one
cannot even acquire personal rights through a free person as intermediary.
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stipulari nemo potest2. Roman law did know some exceptions to the latter rule.
The stipulator could enforce the promise made to him, if he had an actionable
interest of his own or if he used a stipulatio poenae. In such cases the
stipulatio alteri would not be without effect3. Both rules of law, i.e. that one
cannot acquire rights through an extraneus and that one cannot stipulate a
performance which exclusively benefits a third person, may be based upon an
even more fundamental Roman principle. The Romans could only bind
themselves by entering into one of a limited number of contracts which were
acknowledged as a source of obligation and the only person to whom one
would be bound by so doing, was the party to the contract himself. The entire
Roman law of contracts was predominated by the idea that parties, when they
entered into a contract, solely represented themselves and acquired what was
in their own interest or, as the classical jurist Paul stated, “Whatever we
agree has no effect, unless the origin of the obligation lies in ourselves”4.
Obviously contracts created a very personal bond between parties and
excluded outsiders.
In their rejection of the adquisitio obligationis per alterum, the legal
sources of Roman antiquity do not distinguish between cession, contract in
favour of a third party and agency. If in later times – either in learned law or
in indigenous law – it is accepted that one is capable of obtaining a right
through an intermediary, we cannot describe such developments in modern
terms, viz. as acknowledging the validity of contracts in favour of a third
party or agency, if the legal scholarship of the day had not yet discerned the
modern distinctions upon which these qualifications are based.
A case in point are the writings of the Dutch jurist, philologist,
historiographer and poet Hugo Grotius (De Groot, 1583-1645). In his work De
iure belli ac pacis (1625), Grotius distinguished between, on the one hand, the
promise (worded as addressed) to an absent beneficiary (promissio in nomen
eius cui danda est res), which was accepted by someone present, and, on the
other, the promise (to give something to a third person) addressed to and
accepted by the person present (promissio mihi facta de re danda alteri)5.
Some legal historians see in these differently worded promises the origin of
the distinction between agency and contracts in favour of a third party,
thereby presuming that the person accepting the first kind of promise, i.e. the
2 Inst. 3.19.19.
3 Inst. 3.19.20, Paul. D. 2.14.23pr, Ulp. D. 45.1.38.17, Ulp. D. 45.1.38.22 and Diocl.
C. 8.38(39).3.
4 Paul D. 44.7.11: “Quaecumque gerimus, cum ex nostro contractu originem
trahunt, nisi ex nostra persona obligationis initium sumant, inanem actum nostrum
efficiunt: et ideo neque stipulari neque emere uendere contrahere, ut alter suo nomine
recte agat, possumus”.
5 See Hugo Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis, Lib. II, cap. xi, § 18 [1-2], in the edition
B.J.A. de Kanter-Van Hettinga Tromp (Leyden 1939; reprint with additions Aalen
1993) 337-338.
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one worded as addressed to the absent beneficiary, was acting in the name of
the latter6.
Although Grotius’ De jure belli ac pacis is characterized by a Natural Law
approach, there are present a number of elements, derived from existing
traditions, e.g. Roman law, canon law, indigenous law and moral theology.
Grotius’ distinction between promises (worded as addressed) to the absent
beneficiary and promises to give to a third person, but made (worded as
addressed) to someone present, could well be derived from or inspired by
earlier scholars.
This brings us to the central question of this contribution for a volume,
dedicated to a scholar renowned for his expertise in the various traditions of
learned and indigenous law, which eventually produced our present-day
continental European private law. Upon which ideas and concepts were
Grotius’ teachings on the adquisitio obligationis per alterum based? What is
their origin? Which elements concerning this concept, adquisitio obligationis
per alterum, can be discerned previous to the days of Grotius?
Our starting point lies in the fourteenth century in Castile. It consists in
a provision which played a dominant role in the scholarly debate concerning
the stipulatio alteri on the threshold of Grotius’ Natural Law doctrine. We will
investigate in which way this provision deviated from learned law and from
the existing indigenous law of Castile, which in the thirteenth century had
already been affected by an early reception of Roman law. Secondly, we will
pay attention to the role this provision, together with elements derived from
medieval learned law, played in the sixteenth century doctrines of contract
law which may have influenced Grotius. In the third and last part we will
analyse Grotius’ teachings on the adquisitio obligationis per alterum and ask
ourselves which elements and principles can be discerned, and whether or not
they were derived from or inspired by previous legal thinking.
2. The ley ‘Paresciendo’
In his work Europäisches Privatrecht (1500-1800) Helmut Coing
emphasized the importance of the legislation of King Alfonso XI of Castile
6 See J.A. Ankum, De voorouders van een tweehoofdig twistziek monster;
Beschouwingen over de historische ontwikkeling van het beding ten behoeve van een
derde (Zwolle 1967) 28; U. Müller, Die Entwicklung der direkten Stellvertretung und
des Vertrages zugunsten Dritter; Ein dogmengeschichtlicher Beitrag zur Lehre von der
unmittelbaren Drittberechtigung und Drittverpflichtung (Beiträge zur neueren
Privatrechtsgeschichte, 3; Stuttgart 1969) 128; R. Zimmermann, The law of
obligations; Roman foundations of the civilian tradition (Capetown - Wetton -
Johannesburg 1992) 45.
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(1311-1350) for the development of our modern concept of contract7. The
specific provision Coing had in mind, was the ley ‘Paresciendo’ in capitulo 29
of the Ordenamiento de Alcalá, promulgated on 28 February 1348. Three
years afterwards, when the Ordenamiento de Alcalá was revised on the
instructions of King Pedro I (‘el Cruel’, 1334-1369), the provision found its way
into capitulo (titulo) 168. In both versions of the Ordenamiento de Alcalá, the
ley ‘Paresciendo’ was the sole provision (ley unica) in a title dealing with
entering into obligations. The provision ruled that the one who intended to
enter into an obligation, whether this was achieved by promise, contract or in
any other way, would be obliged to fulfil the commitment he had made. This
purport of the ley ‘Paresciendo’ also follows from the fact that it explicitly
denied the promisor the possibility of blocking the creditor’s claim by stating
that no obligation had come into being, because the promise was not
formulated as prescribed by the law or because the parties, i.e. promisor and
beneficiary, had not come together to conclude the contract or enter into the
obligation.
Ordenamiento de Alcalá (1348), capitulo 29
If it appears that someone intends to bind himself to another through a
promise, or through a contract, or in any other manner, he is obligated to
perform what he promised to do, and he cannot bring as a defence, that no
stipulation had taken place, i.e. no promise was made in conformity with the
7 H. Coing, Europäisches Privatrecht, Part I, Älteres Gemeines Recht (1500-1800)
(Munich 1985) 400.
8 The Ordenamiento de Alcalá is handed down through many manuscripts and in
two editions. In 1774 the text was edited by I. Jordán de Asso y del Río and M. de
Manuel y Rodríguez [El Ordenamiento de leyes que don Alfonso XI hizo en las Cortes de
Alcalá el año de mil trescientos y cuarenta y ocho (Madrid 1774; reprint Valladolid
1983); see about this edition: E. Conde Naranjo, Medioevo Ilustrado; La edición erudita
del Ordenamiento de Alcalá (1774) (Sevilla 1999)]. In 1861 it was incorporated in the
edition Cortes de los antiguos reinos de Léon y de Castilla publicadas por la Real
Academia de la Historia I (Madrid 1861) 492-593. In the transcriptions of manuscripts
we consulted and which according to F. Waltman, Textos y Concordancias del
Ordenamiento de Alacalá (Madison 1994), 23 contain the revised version of 1351
(Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional, Vit. 15-7 and Res. 9), the ley ‘Paresciendo’ can be found
in capitulo 16, just as in the edition of 1774, whereas in the edition of 1861 it has its
place in capitulo 29. As regards contents the text has not been altered, altough there
are considerable differences in spelling and sometimes also in the wording between the
several manuscripts and editions. A modern, textcritical edition is still lacking. See for
the origin and tradition of the Ordenamiento de Alcalá: G. Sánchez, ‘Sobre el
Ordenamiento de Alacalá (1348) y sus fuentes’, Revista de Derecho Privado 9 (1922)
353-369, especially 357; E.N. van Kleffens, Hispanic law until the end of the Middle
Ages (Edinburgh 1968), 218-228; A. Pérez Martín, ‘El Ordenamiento de Alcalá (1348) y
las glosas de Vicente Arias de Balboa’, Ius commune 11 (1984) 55-215, especially 55-60.
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formalities of the law, or that the obligation was entered into or the contract
was concluded between absent persons.
Concerning the promise to give something to an absent beneficiary, which
was accepted by someone who was present, the ley ‘Paresciendo’ subsequently
ruled the following:
[neither can he bring the defence] that between absent persons [the promise9]
to give to the other10, was made in the presence of a public clerk or someone
else, a private person, or that he promised to one person, to give something to
or to do something for another person.
Beyond doubt the obligation or contract is valid, no matter the way it was
entered into, if it appears that someone intended to bind himself to some other
person by concluding a contract with him11.
As we shall see below, the ley ‘Paresciendo’ explicitly excluded two kinds
of defence which Roman law and, because of the early reception of Roman law
in Castile, also Castilian law offered the promisor. Both resulted from the
Roman principles per extraneam personam nihil adquiri posse and alteri
stipulari nemo potest. For this reason the provision, promulgated in 1348, was
not only of great significance for the emergence of our modern concept of
contract, but also for developments which eventually led to the acceptance of
contracts in favour of a third party and direct representation, as we find these
in most modern systems of private law in continental Europe12.
9 See for the problem whether we should read here the word ‘promysion’ or the
words ‘obligaçión o contrato’: § V of this contribution (Direct representation
acknowledged?).
10 The ley ‘Paresciendo’ speaks about the promise “in the name of another”, [la
promysion] en nombre de otro. The same phrasing is used in Partidas 5.11.7 (see note
23 and 27). There, the words are meant to indicate that something will be given to the
absent beneficiary, i.e. a person other than the stipulator. The same holds good for the
ley ‘Paresciendo’. The words “in the name of another” cannot be adopted in the sense
that it is the other, the one in whose name the promise was made, who has to perform
something.
11 Ordenamiento de Alcalá, c. 29 (edition Cortes de los antiguos reinos (...), I, 514):
“Paresçiendo que se quiso alguno obligar aotro por promysion opor algun contracto oen
otra manera, sea tenudo aaquellos aquien se obligó et non pueda ser puesta excepçion
que non fue fecha stipulaçion que quier dezir prometimiento con çierta solepnidat del
derecho, e que fue fecha la obligaçion o el contrato entre absentes, oque fue fecha
aescriuano publico oaotra persona priuada en nonbre de otro entre absentes, o que se
obligó a vno de dar ode fazer alguna cosa aotro: mas que sea baledera la obligaçion o el
contracto que fueren fechos en qual quier manera que paresca que alguno se quiso
obligar aotro ofazer contracto conel”.
12 The ley is mentioned by J.C. de Wet, Die ontwikkeling van die ooreenkoms ten
behoewe van ‘n derde [dissertation Leyden 1940] (Leyden 1940) 85 and Müller, Die
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3. The promise to give something to an absent person
The first part of the ley ‘Paresciendo’ dealt with the situation where there
were two parties involved, who were entering into an obligation by making a
promise, concluding a contract or in any other way. One party committed
himself to give something to the other, who may, therefore, be called the
‘beneficiary’. Although the parties are usually termed the ‘promisor’ and the
‘stipulator’, since in this situation the stipulator is the beneficiary, we prefer
to use the terms ‘promisor’ and ‘beneficiary’, since we will later also discuss in
detail the case where the stipulator and the beneficiary are not the same
person.
Was the fact that the promisor intended to obligate himself to the other,
sufficient to constitute an enforceable right for the beneficiary? First, there
was the question, if the promisor committed himself by means of a promise,
“Was it necessary for him to observe certain formalities?”. The second
question is “Must parties come together in order to conclude a contract or
enter into an obligation?”. In general terms the ley ‘Paresciendo’ maintained
that an obligation will arise, as soon as someone appeared to be intending to
commit himself to another by means of a promise (promysion), a contract or in
any other manner13.
Obviously there were no formalities required to obligate oneself by means
of a promise. This followed from the fact that – as the ley ‘Paresciendo’
stated – the promisor could no longer block the beneficiary’s claim by stating
that he was not bound by his word, since the Roman law formalities for the
stipulatio had not been observed. Thus through the introduction of the
Ordenamiento de Alcalá, Castilian law started in this respect to deviate from
Roman law, which required that the promise (promissio) was the answer to
the beneficiary’s oral question: do you promise me (promittis mihi) to give me
something or to do something for me? Question and answer together
constituted the stipulatio. According to the Corpus iuris, a promise to donate
something or to grant a credit could only become enforceable if it took the
form of a stipulatio. However, in legal practice the stipulatio was used for
several more purposes. This followed from the fact that in post-classical law
Entwicklung 98. According to Müller the ley ‘Paresciendo’ – although the provision was
never quoted or referred to – may have influenced legal doctrine in the Southern
Netherlands, which were during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries under
Spanish dominion.
13 For example by means of a last will. Cf. Vicente Arias de Balboa, the gloss E an
otra manera sea tenudo ad Ordenamiento de Alcalá cap. 16: “Scilicet in ultima
uoluntate, nam in hoc fieri potest, ut lege Ex sententia Digesto de testibus (D.
26.2.29)”. The gloss was edited in A. Pérez Martín, ‘Las glosas de Arias de Balboa al
Ordenamiento de Alcalá’, Aspekte europäischer Rechtsgeschichte; Festgabe für Helmut
Coing zum 70. Geburtstag (Ius commune Sonderhefte 17; Frankfurt am Main 1984)
276-277 (nr. 43) and in Pérez Martín, El Ordenamiento de Alcalá, 174 (nr. 81).
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various agreements were drawn up in instruments, using the wording of the
stipulatio. In Late Antiquity, a corresponding oral wording of question and
answer was no longer required, although it was still necessary that the
parties were present in order to conclude the contract. From a theoretical
viewpoint the stipulatio continued to be an oral contract (contractus verbis),
but actually it was always encapsulated in an instrument. Consequently the
stipulatio inter absentes was not effective, even if the promise in the
instrument was correctly worded (promittis ... ? promitto).
The presence of promisor and beneficiary at the moment the stipulatio
was entered into was the main formal requirement which the medieval jurists
derived from the Corpus iuris civilis14. In regions where the reception of
Roman law took place, this requirement was adopted in indigenous law. This
also holds good for Castile, as appears from the Siete Partidas, the
compilation King Alfonso X (1221-1284) in 1265 declared to be applicable for
all inhabitants of his realm15. However, the presence of parties was not the
only formality derived from Justinianic law. Partidas 5.11.1 required, both
that the beneficiary be present and that the promise be the answer to the
beneficiary’s question. As a consequence, inserting the promise in an
instrument – also a common practice during the Middle Ages! – was
insufficient to make the promise enforceable. The beneficiary had to be
present at the moment the instrument was composed. Thus, until 1348 a
stipulatio inter absentes had no binding force16.
We should realize that the ley ‘Paresciendo’ was not restricted to
stipulations but covered all kinds of agreements. For this reason, the
introduction of the Ordenamiento de Alcalá modified existing Castilian law in
another respect. As was shown above, the ley ‘Paresciendo’ no longer required
the beneficiary to be present at the moment the promise was pronounced.
Roman law, however, required the presence of the parties not only for the
stipulatio, but also for other agreements, especially the four real contracts
(contractus re). Only in case of contractus consensu, i.e. the contracts entered
into by mere consent (sale, rent, partnership and mandate), Roman law
acknowledged that the contract could come into being by means of a letter or a
14 Cf. R. Trifone, ‘La “stipulatio” nelle dottrine dei glossatori’, Studi di Storia del
diritto in onore di Enrico Besta per il XL anno del suo insegnamento, I (Milan 1939)
171-198 [= Scritti minori (Bari 1966) 167-190].
15 In the literature there is debate as to whether the Partidas were actually applied
in legal pratice as a code of law. The Partidas may have served much sooner as a book
of reference. The Ordenamiento de Alcalá explicitly declared the Partidas to be an
(additional) source of law.
16 Cf. Partidas 5.11.1. If one of the parties did not speak the language used, it
sufficed that he was present and endorsed what his trujamana (interpreter) had
promised or stipulated.
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messenger (nuntius) 17. Thus in Castile, after an early reception of Roman law
had taken place through the Partidas, major parts of the indigenous law of
contract were characterized by certain formalities which had to be observed,
in particular the presence of the parties to the contract. However, the Roman
law rulings were not infrequently applied by persons who were not master of
the ancient formalities and this resulted in the invalidity of many legal acts18.
The Ordenamiento de Alcalá obviated this problem19. As stated above, from
1348 onwards it was no longer required that the promise (promysion) was
formulated as Partidas 5.11.1 prescribed, i.e. as an answer to the question: do
you promise me ... ?, but neither was there a need to come together in order to
enter into the contract or obligation.
In theory the question could also arise whether the law of Castile had, by
introducing the ley ‘Paresciendo’, acknowledged the unilateral statement as a
source of obligation, thereby again deviating from learned law. The ley
‘Paresciendo’ itself did not pronounce upon the question whether the promise
had to be accepted20. Could the ley ‘Paresciendo’ be interpreted to imply that
the promise once expressed, could no longer be revoked, even if it had not yet
been accepted by the beneficiary? Such questions were extensively discussed
in the sixteenth century commentaries. However, in earlier sources such as,
for example, the gloss of Vicente Arias de Balboa († 1414) on the
Ordenamiento de Alcalá not a single trace of this discussion can be found21.
4. The promise to give something to a third person
The second part of the ley ‘Paresciendo’ dealt with the situation, where
three persons were involved, viz. the person who committed himself to give
something to an absent beneficiary, the actual beneficiary of that promise,
17 Cf. E. Bussi, ‘La rappresentanza negli atti “inter vivos” dei nascituri non concepti
e delle persone assenti secondo il diritto comune’, Rivista di Diritto Privato (1933), II,
3-26.
18 At any rate according to Pérez Martín, ‘El Ordenamiento de Alcalá’ 80-81,
referring in note 100 (p. 81) to D. 2.14.7.4-5.
19 According to Marichalar and Manrique the ley ‘Paresciendo’ banished all the
Roman formalities concerning stipulations as to be found in the Partidas. However, the
authors did not refer to specific provisions in the Partidas. See A. Marichalar - C.
Manrique, Historia de la legislación y recitaciones del derecho civil en España, III
(Madrid 1862), 226.
20 De Wet maintained erroneously (De Wet, Die ontwikkeling 85) that the ley
‘Paresciendo’ “n actie gee ex nudo pacto”. He based this opinion on the commentary of
Diego Pérez de Salamanca on Ordenanzas reales de Castilla 3.8.3. However, Pérez’s
remark “lex ista ... fundamentum habet a capitulo primo de pactis (X 1.35.1)” must be
evaluated against the background of sixteenth century debate. Cf. p. § VI (The
unilateral promise as source of obligation) of this contribution.
21 These glosses were edited by Pérez Martín; cf. notes 8 and 13.
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and someone else who was present at the moment the promise was made and
had accepted it. In the terminology of Roman law the latter, i.e. the one who
accepted the promise, would be termed the ‘stipulator’. He is the one who
stipulated that something be given to the beneficiary. To put it differently, the
ley ‘Paresciendo’ dealt with the stipulatio alteri, the contract to give something
to or do something for a third person. Usually the stipulatio alteri is described
as a stipulation ‘in favour of a third party’. However, such a stipulation or
pact in Roman law and in the ius commune can easily be identified with the
modern concept of the contract in favour of a third party (Vertrag zugunsten
Dritter, contratto a favore di terzi). In order to avoid this modern term, we
prefer to use the Latin stipulatio alteri.
The ley ‘Paresciendo’ explicitly excluded two defences resulting from the
rule alteri stipulari nemo potest, which maxim in the ius commune also
covered the principle that no rights can be acquired through an extraneus. The
promisor could not block the beneficiary’s claim by stating that the latter was
not entitled to send another in his place to accept the promise. Nor could he
object that no obligation had come into being, because the stipulator and the
beneficiary were not one and the same person. This is another respect in
which the law of Castile after 1348 deviated from Roman law, which was
willing to grant the beneficiary an action only in a limited number of cases,
viz. when his son or slave had stipulated on his behalf, and in a restricted
number of other specific cases, as comprehensively listed by Accursius (†
1263) in the gloss Nihil agit ad Inst. 3.19.4.
Moreover, according to Inst. 3.19.19-20 (alteri stipulari nemo potest) even
the stipulator could not enforce the promise to give something to another
person22, which in the ius commune was understood as a consequence of the
fact that the stipulator had no financial interest in the performance for the
other. The procurator, however, who acted on the instructions of the
beneficiary, held a special position. If he stipulated that something be given to
his principal, this resulted in an obligation, albeit not between the promisor
and the beneficiary (the procurator’s principal), but between the promisor and
the stipulator (the procurator). In regions, where a reception of Roman law
had taken place, this exceptional position of the procurator can also be traced
in indigenous law. As we will see below, this also holds good for Castile.
As a basic rule the Siete Partidas contained a provision reminiscent of
Inst. 3.19.4, namely that no one is capable of accepting the promise that
22 However, a stipulatio poenae would be enforceable. In the gloss Supra dictum est
ad Inst. 3.19.19 (see note 72), Accursius prescribed in which way the penalty clause
had to be phrased in order to be effective. Furthermore, this gloss mentioned a specific
formula, which a procurator and which a manager of another’s affairs could use when
they stipulated that something be given to their principal. In all these cases the third
person had no direct action.
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something will be given to another person23. The stipulator of a stipulatio
alteri is not capable of enforcing the promise, neither is the beneficiary.
Having this said, the Partidas mentioned a number of exceptions, listed
below, in which the beneficiary did acquire an action. In some of these cases
he acquired it through ‘assignment’ by the stipulator. Moreover, it should be
noted that the Partidas mentioned fewer cases than the sixteen recorded by
Accursius in the gloss Nihil agit ad Inst. 3.19.424. These cases in which the
beneficiary had an action at his disposal, were the following.
(i) the promise to a son, slave25 or conventual
According to Partidas 5.11.7 a son, slave and conventual were capable of
accepting the promise to give something to a third person (promission en nome
de tercera persona), viz. a father, an owner and a superior. This third person
would have an action26.
(ii) the promise to a magistrate or court clerk
A tutor would, on the occasion of his appointment, promise the
magistrate or the court clerk to administer his pupil’s patrimony well.
Similarly, in a reconciliation procedure one could promise not to revenge the
delict on the offender’s family27. The first example is derived from D. 46.6.1-4,
where the tutor made this promise to a servus publicus28. The pupil would
23 See Partidas 5.11.7: “Un ome non puede rescebir promission de otro en nome de
tercera persona so cuyo poder no fuesse. E seria como si dixesse el uno al otro,
prometes me que des a fulan tal cosa, e el otro respondiesse prometo”.
24 Compared to Partidas 5.11.7-9, the Corpus iuris acknowledged another eight
cases, as e.g. the pact to restore to a third person the dowry or the object lent or
deposited and the granting of a gift under the condition to transfer the object donated
after a lapse of time to a second donee (donatio sub modo). In all these cases the third
beneficiary could sue the promisor.
25 After the victory over the Moors at las Novas de Tolosa (1212) a few thousand
Islamic prisoners of war were sold as slaves. The same occurred after the battle at
Jerez de la Frontera (1231) and the attack on Córdoba (1236). Prisoners of war had the
choice between returning to their home against payment or being sold as slaves. Cf. C.
Verlinden, L’esclavage dans l’Europe médievale, I (Péninsule Ibérique. France) (Bruges
1955) 546-561.
26 Cf. Partidas 5.11.7. This is in conformity with learned law, which in such cases
also granted an action to the beneficiary. Cf. the gloss Si quis ad Inst. 3.19.4 of
Accursius, which mentions, apart from a son and slave, the monk.
27 Partidas 5.11.7: “(...) E aun dezimos que los judgadores e los escriuanos de
concejo, que escriuen con ellos, pueden rescebir promission en nome de otro. E esto
seria, si la rescebiessen en nome de algund huerfano prometiendole el guardador que
lealmente guardasse a la persone del huerfano e a sus bienes. E si la rescebiesse en
juyzio de la una parte en nome de otro, sobre algun pleyto, que oviesse entre ellos. O si
la rescibiessen, tomando tregua de vno en nome de otro”.
28 Cf. Partidas 5.11.7: “(...) por que estos officiales atales, son como siervos publicos,
del concejo do biven, por razon de las cosas que han de fazer, que pertenescen a su
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have an action on reaching majority. In this respect Castilian law did not
deviate from the ius commune, which also acknowledged that promises to
magistrates and court clerks give rise to an action29.
(iii) the promise to a tutor or curator
A promise could also be made to a tutor or a curator. In such a case the
beneficiary, i.e. the person confined to the tutor or curator’s care, could
enforce what was promised as soon as he acquired procedural capacity30.
(iv) the promise to a personero
As regards the personero, the Partidas drew a distinction between
personeros of administrative authorities (personero del Rey, o del comun, de
alguna cibdad, o villa, o de alguna tierra) and personeros of a private citizen.
Where the administrative authorities had acted through a personero, they
themselves acquired an action, just as in Roman law the municipium derived
an action from the contract entered into by its actor municipum. The position
of the personero, appointed by a private citizen, in order to take care of the
latter’s affairs during his absence31, on the other hand, was quite similar to
that of the procurator in Roman law. When acting on behalf of his principal, it
was the personero who acquired the action, which he later had to ‘assign’ to
the principal, i.e. by authorizing him to bring this action against the
promisor32. Only in exceptional cases, did a private person acquire an action
which was not ‘assigned’ to him by his personero. The Partidas mentioned two
cases, both derived from learned law. The principal had a direct action, if the
personero had stipulated a performance, related to his principal’s property33,
oficio”. Partidas 5.11.7 mentioned also a different explanation: parties were subjected
to the magistrate’s authority.
29 Accursius, gloss Nihil agit ad Inst. 3.19.4: “(...) item fallit in iudice uel notario uel
simili persona publica ex quorum pactis in stipulationibus alteri queritur. ut ff. rem
pu. sal. fore l.ii. iii. et iiii. (D. 46.6.2-4)”.
30 Cf. Partidas 5.11.8; this was also the case in learned law; cf. the gloss Nihil agit
ad Inst. 3.19.4.
31 When the principal was present at the moment the procurator or personero
accepted the promise in his favour, he would have an action against the promisor, both
according to Roman law (D. 45.1.79) and Castilian law (Partidas 5.11.9).
32 Cf. Partidas 5.11.8: “(...) pero non puede demandar, aquel en cuyo nome fue
fecha, que le de, o quel fagan lo que es prometido, fasta que el personero, que la
rescibio por el: le otorgue poder: que la pueda demandar”.
33 Cf. Partidas 5.11.8: “(...) si la promission es fecha sobre cosa que fuese suya,
propria de aquel cuyo personero es”. J.A. Arias Bonet, ‘Estipulaciones a favor de
tercero en los glosadores y en Las Partidas’, Anuario de Historia del Derecho español
34 (1964), 235-248, maintains erroneously that the principal would have a direct action
whenever the personero had acted within the limits of the mandate he received (see p.
248).
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e.g. to pay the rent to the principal himself34. The other exception concerned a
specific case, where the principal had a great interest that the action was
‘assigned’ to him, but the stipulator (procurator) refused to do so, viz. where
the latter appeared to be insolvent. In such a case the principal could even
without ‘assignment’ of his procurator’s action sue the promisor35. Thus, the
position of the personero, appointed by a private citizen, was similar to that of
the procurator in Roman law36.
Thus, according to the Partidas, the beneficiary could enforce the
promise, stipulated by his son, slave or conventual, the promise stipulated by
magistrates, by his tutor and curator, and, after ‘assignment’ of the action
also the promise stipulated by his personero. As seen above, these were
exceptions to the general rule, stated in Partidas 5.11.7, viz. that nobody can
accept a promise to give something to a third person, for it would be, as if he
had stipulated: do you promise me, to give something to a third person? To
put it differently, the stipulatio alteri had no effect. Neither the beneficiary
nor the stipulator could enforce it. However, since 1348 the ley ‘Paresciendo’
explicitly excluded the two defences based upon the Roman law principles per
extraneam personam nihil adquiri potest and alteri stipulari nemo potest. It
ruled that the promisor could no longer bring the defences (...) that between
absent persons [the promise] to give to the other, was made in the presence of
a public clerk or some private person; or that he promised one person, to give
something to or to do something for another person37.
In the first place the promisor could no longer maintain that the claim of
the beneficiary should be dismissed, because not the beneficiary himself, but
another person, a notary or a private person, had been present, when the
promise was made. In the fourteenth century it was the practice, especially in
34 Cf. Accursius, gloss Ex re domini ad D. 3.3.68 and Partidas 5.11.8.
35 Cf. Partidas 5.11.8; the same holds good for the institor in Roman law; see D.
14.3.1-2.
36 Learned law has strongly influenced the provisions of Partidas 5.11.9. In the
gloss Nihil agit ad Inst. 3.19.4 Accursius mentioned three exceptions to the rule that
the principal can derive no rights from the pact stipulated by the procurator in his
favour. Two of these were also mentioned in the Partidas, i.e. the principal being
present at the moment the procurator stipulated in his favour and the procurator
acting as the principal’s representative in legal proceedings. For a third exception
Accursius referred to the procurator uendentis in D. 19.1.13.25: the one on whose
mandate the procurator had sold an object could claim the selling price directly from
the purchaser. This seems to indicate, that there is no room in the texts of the Partidas
to presume a more extensive application of the personería, as was maintained by Arias
Bonet, Estipulaciones a favor de tercero, 245-248.
37 Ordenamiento de Alcalá, c. 29 I (edition Cortes de los antiguos reinos (...), 514:
“(...) oque [la promysion] fue fecha aescriuano publico oaotra persona priuada en
nonbre de otro entre absentes, o que se obligó a vno de dar ode fazer alguna cosa aotro
(...)”.
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case of donations, to embody the promise to give something to an absent
beneficiary in a notarial instrument. In the instrument the promise was
formulated as a stipulatio. The notary stipulated that something be given to
an absent beneficiary and the promisor gave his consent. Certain questions
arose. Was this practice in conformity with the ius commune? Should the
notary, who often acted without the beneficiary’s mandate, e.g. in case of a
donation to an unborn child, be rated among the exceptional cases, where it
was indeed possible to stipulate that something be given to another?
Moreover, could the notary be compared to the Roman servus publicus, who
was capable of stipulating for any other person38? In Castilian law the
promisor could simply bring as a defence, at any rate previous to the
introduction of the Ordenamiento de Alcalá, that the Partidas only gave effect
to promises made to a public clerk in his capacity as court clerk, not to
promises made before public clerks in general39. As seen above, this defence
also covered the case where the promise was made in the presence of a private
person, who obviously had accepted it. In neither situation could the promisor
block the beneficiary’s claim. In theory this stipulator could be the
beneficiary’s personero, accepting the promise ‘in his name’, but the text of the
ley ‘Paresciendo’ simply speaks about ‘another’, including those persons acting
without the beneficiary’s mandate.
The second defence, viz. that the defendant had promised to one person,
to give something to or to do something for another person, is directly derived
from Inst. 3.19.19: No obligation can arise, when one promises that something
is given to another40. As a consequence, in Justinianic law neither the
38 Baldus de Ubaldis approved of this development. He considered the notary to be
comparable in this respect to the seruus publicus. Cf. Baldus, ad D. 12.1.9.8:
“Communis practica et consuetudo simpliciter approbat quod si notarius pro alio
recepit, queritur alteri sine cessione, quia est publica persona (...)”.
39 Cf. Partidas 5.11.7 (see note 27). This was defended for canon law by Innocent IV
(† 1254). Cf. Innocentius IV, ad X 3.3.2.20. A reference to Innocent can be found in
Gregorio López de Tovar (1496-1560), gloss Semejante ad Partidas 5.11.7 (Quinta
Partida, Salamanca 1555, fol. 63va). Cf. R. Núñez Lagos, La estipulación en las
Partidas y el Ordenamiento de Alcalá (Madrid 1950), 60. In sixteenth century legal
scholarship, it was apparently beyond dispute that the promise to an absent person in
the presence of a public clerk was binding. That could be the reason why in later
compilations the ley ‘Paresciendo’ has an alternative reading, viz. that the promisor
cannot object that the promise “was not made in the presence of a public clerk”. Cf.
Nueva Recopilación 5.16.2, (Madrid 1640; reprint Madrid 1982), V, fol. 45r: “(...) o que
no fue hecho ante escrivano publico, o que fue hecha a otra persona privada en nombre
de otros entre ausentes (...)”.
40 A different opinion was defended by Núñez Lagos, La estipulación 63. He
understood the words “o que se obligó uno de dar, o de facer alguna cosa a otro” (from
the 1774 edition which he used) as the promise that something is given or done by the
other (por otro). His interpretation may be based on the phrasing of the ley
‘Paresciendo’ after it was adopted in later compilations, such as in the Ordenanzas
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beneficiary nor the stipulator had at his disposal an action which he might
‘assign’ to the beneficiary. This was apart from the exceptional cases
mentioned above.
The text of the Ordenamiento de Alcalá may create the impression that
the third party acquired a direct claim based on the stipulatio alteri, but we
will see below whether this is in accordance with the words of the text or not41.
Baldus de Ubaldis (1320-1400) acknowledged that local legislation may
deviate from the ius commune and attribute an action to the third party in
order to enforce the performance. However he did not mention the ley
‘Paresciendo’ as an example42.
Apart from the cases listed in the gloss Nihil agit, the ius commune
always required an ‘assignment’ of the claim, i.e. that, where the stipulator,
e.g. a procurator, had an action at his disposal, he appointed the beneficiary
as procurator in rem suam43. The question whether the absent beneficiary
would not in general be entitled to a direct action, had in earlier times been
disputed by the glossators and the canonists. In the twelfth century it was the
glossator Martinus Gosia († before 1166) who had maintained, that every
beneficiary had an action based on equity44, but hardly any other glossator
followed this view. All later glossators followed the opinion of Bulgarus de
Bulgarinis († 1166), as expressed by one of his students, Wilhelm de Cabriano
(saec. XII), viz. that the texts in the Corpus iuris, where the third party has an
action, should be considered as exceptions to the general rule. As a
reales de Castilla (1484) composed by Alonso Díaz de Montalvo (1405-1499) on the
instructions of the Reyes Católicos and in the Nueva Recopilación (1567), since a
similar interpretation can be found in sixteenth century authors in their commentary
on Ordenanzas reales 8.3.8. The words just quoted were now replaced by the phrase “o
que se obligo alguno que dara otro, o de hazer alguna cosa”. Also in the wording of
Nueva Recopilación 5.16.2 (“o que se obligo alguno que daria otro, o haria alguna cosa”)
one can read a stipulatio alieni facti.
41 See § V (Direct representation acknowledged?) of this contribution, in fine.
42 Cf. Baldus de Ubaldis, In decretalium volumen commentaria (Venice 1595), ad X
1.2.7 nr. 71 (fol. 17v): “(...) Sed numquid ex pacto uasalli (...) acquiratur actio
proprietario? Videtur quod sic. ff. depo. Publia (D. 16.3.26pr), quia ista personalis
obligatio est unita cum realitate feudi, arg. C. per quas personas nobis acquiratur l. fi.
(C. 4.27.3). Item quia paciscitur super re sua, l.i. C. de dona. que sub modo (C.
8.53(54).1) et quia consuetudo feudorum ita disponit, que firmat pactum. Et sic lex
municipalis posset statuere quod alter alteri posset stipulari et quod non requiretur
cessio. i. q. vii. Quoties cordis (C.1 q.7 c.9)”. Later Jason de Maino (1435-1519), In
secundam Digesti Novi partem Commentaria (Turin 1623), ad D. 45.1.38.17 nr. 2 (fol.
64r) and Gregorio López (see note 59) referred to this passage.
43 Cf. K. Luig, Zur Geschichte der Zessionslehre (Forschungen zur Neuren
Privatrechtsgeschichte, 10; Cologne-Graz 1966) 12-16.
44 This appears from a dissensio dominorum ascribed to Hugolinus († after 1223):
“Item dicit M(artinus) quod ex alieno pacto utilis actio datur ei in cuius persona
conceptum est”. Cf. G. Haenel, Dissensiones dominorum, (Leipzig 1834; reprint Aalen
1964), Hugolinus, § 256 (428-429).
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consequence these exceptional cases should not be generalized or regarded as
the application of a general principle45.
Similarly, medieval canon law granted the third party a remedy only in
exceptional situations and by no means as generally as Martinus46. It may
seem that in the apparatus on Gratian’s Decretum (ad C.1 q.7 c.9)47 by
Laurentius Hispanus († 1245) and Johannes Teutonicus (ca. 1170-1245), who
adopted Laurentius’ commentary in the Ordinary Gloss on Gratian’s
Decretum, the third party would derive a right from the stipulatio alteri.
However, these canonists merely stated that the promisor was bound, without
pronouncing upon the question to whom he was bound, the stipulator or the
beneficiary. Moreover, none of the other canonists deduced from C.1 q.7 c.9
that the third person would have an action at his disposal48. It is clear that in
canon law the Roman law principle alteri stipulari nemo potest was no longer
in force. If someone intended to donate something by means of a performance
by another person (the promisor), he could stipulate that something be given
to a third person, the beneficiary. For example, a lessor could stipulate that
part of the rent be paid not to himself, but to a charitable fund. This pact
would give rise to an obligation between the stipulator and the promisor, in
spite of the fact that the stipulator had no actionable interest in the
performance for the third person. However, there was dispute as to whether
this obligation could be enforced and in which way.
5. Direct representation acknowledged?
In the secondary literature it is maintained that Partidas 5.11.8 had
acknowledged agency for cases of legal representation49. As regards voluntary
45 Wilhelm de Cabriano, Casus Codicis ad C. 4.27.1; cf. J. Hallebeek, Audi domine
Martine; Over de aequitas gosiana en het beding ten behoeve van een derde (Amsterdam
2000) 4-5.
46 Cf. A. Padoa Schioppa, ‘Sul principio della rappresentanza diretta nel Diritto
canonico classico’, Proceedings of the Fourth International Congress of Medieval Canon
Law (Monumenta Iuris Canonici, Series C, subsidia 5; Città del Vaticano 1976) 107-
131.
47 Glosa Palatina, ad C.1 q.7 c.9 (edited in Padoa Schioppa, ‘Sul principio della
rappresentanza’ 116): “(...) Sed credo iure canonico me teneri si ego promitto tibi me
daturum Titio decem. xxii q.v Iuramenti (C.22 q.5 c.12), maxime ubi interuenit
sacramentum. arg. ff. de const. pecu. l.i. (D. 13.5.1pr)”.
48 Antonius de Butrio († 1408) and Nicolaus de Tedeschis († 1445) maintained that
via denunciationis evangelicae the promisor could be compelled to perform. Baldus, on
the other hand, saw the text of C.1 q.7 c.9 as a ground for assuming that the lex
municipalis can grant the beneficiary an action. See note 42.
49 Partidas 5.11.8 maintained that a tutor and curator can stipulate for the person
confined to their care. However, there is no ground for the presumption that the
Partidas in this respect wanted to deviate from Roman law and to grant an action
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representation Partidas 5.11.8 would be inclined to do the same, at any rate
to a greater extent than the ius commune, whereas the ley ‘Paresciendo’ is
said to have acknowledged agency (direct representation) once and for all50.
However, these views may be doubted. Present day law attaches specific
legal consequences to the pact and promise in the name of another, viz. that
the third person in whose name the intermediary acted, directly and
exclusively acquires all rights and obligations. In such a case we speak about
agency or direct representation51. There are in the Corpus iuris some texts, in
which a procurator nomine tertii entered into a contract52, although the third
party in whose name he acted did not derive exclusive rights and obligations
from this contract. The medieval jurists deduced from these texts that a
procurator could stipulate nomine domini that something be given to his
principal. According to Accursius, the correct wording of the stipulation to be
used in such a case was promittis quod dabis mihi recipienti nomine eius? (do
you promise to give to me, receiving in his name?)53. Odofredus de Denariis (†
1265) formulated this stipulation in a slightly different way, which stated
exactly what the procurator was accepting on behalf of his principal, viz. the
promise: promittis mihi recipienti nomine domini mei quod restitueres rem54?
A similar idea is expressed in the Partidas, which, by the way, did not
speak about stipulating, but about accepting a promise, described as
promission en nome de tercera persona. One would perhaps expect this phrase
to indicate that the promise was specifically worded as addressed to the
absent beneficiary as if the stipulator had asked ‘do you promise Titius (the
absent beneficiary) to give him?’ and subsequently had accepted the promise
in Titius’ name. This is, however, not the case. The promise could as well have
been addressed to the stipulator, as if he had asked: do you promise me to give
to Titius55?
exclusively to the pupil or curandus, while the Partidas did not pronounce upon the
pact stipulated by a father for his child under paternal control.
50 Cf. Núñez Lagos, La estipulación 48 and 60; Arias Bonet, Estipulaciones a favor
de tercero 248 and note 24.
51 Cf. the description in Padoa Schioppa, ‘Sul principio della rappresentanza’ 107.
52 Cf. for bringing an action nomine tertii and acquiring possession nomine tertii:
S.U. Kahn, ‘Bedeutungswandel von “nomine” in den Rechtsquellen der Westgoten und
der Spanier der “Reconquista”’, Ius commune 11 (1984) 217-230, especially p. 217.
53 Cf. Accursius, gloss Supra dictum est ad Inst. 3.19.19 (see note 72).
54 Cf. Odofredus, Lectura Codicis, (Lyons 1562; reprint Bologna 1968), ad C. 4.27.1
nr. 4 (fol. 225r): “(...) Interdum promissionem et restitutionem concipiendo in sua
persona nomine domini, uerbi gratia, promittis mihi recipienti nomine domini mei
quod restitueres rem, dicit ille, promitto, ualet ista stipulatio: quia acquiret sibi
actionem sed domino tenetur cedere”.
55 In the Partidas the ‘promission en nome de tercera persona’ is made to a
stipulator being present and accepting the promise, as appears from Partidas 5.11.10:
“Debda de dineros, o de otra cosa deviendo un ome a otro si este debdor rescibiesse
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The Partidas attached various effects to the acceptance of a promission
en nome de tercera persona. Sometimes the principal acquired a claim, such as
the father whose son had accepted a promise in his father’s name56.
Sometimes it was not the beneficiary, but the stipulator who acquired the
claim, for example the debtor who stipulated that someting be paid to his
creditor. Further if the personero accepted in the name of his principal, this
distinction existed. If he represented the king or another administrative
authority, his position was comparable to that of the actor municipum in
Roman law. Partidas 5.11.8 granted an action to the one in whose name the
promise was accepted, i.e. the king, the city, the community, etc. As stated
above, the personero of a private person himself acquired the action, when he
accepted in the name of his principal, but was obliged to ‘assign’ this claim to
his principal, by appointing him procurator in rem suam.
Can we trace in Partidas 5.11.7-10 an inclination to acknowledge direct
representation in the modern sense, i.e. that acceptance ‘in his name’ by the
intermediary resulted in a direct and exclusive obligation between the absent
third party and the promisor? The Partidas quite often speak about
acceptance in the name of a third party. May we assume this is
representation, i.e. the acceptance in the name of the beneficiary, by which
the beneficiary acquired a right? Did the magistrate represent the
beneficiary? Was an action denied to the beneficiary, if the promise was not
accepted in his name?
It cannot be deduced from the texts in the Partidas that through the
stipulation of a son, slave or conventual an exclusive and direct right was
acquired by the father, master or superior, although, according to the ius
commune, this should have been the case. As we will see below, according to
the Accursian Gloss, it was of no importance in which way sons under
paternal control and slaves formulated the stipulation for their father or
master, viz. either as a promise to their father or master or as a promise to
themselves. Thus, if we presume that the Partidas were strongly influenced
by the ius commune, in Castilian law too the father, master or superior would
acquire a right, but we should not attach too much importance to the fact that
promission de otro, en nome de aquel: cuyo debdor es, diziendo assi, prometes me que
dedes a sulano tantos maravedis, o tal cosa que le devo yo” (...).
56 Partidas 5.11.7-10 spoke about acceptance in the name of another (recebir en
nome de otro), when a son, slave or conventual stipulated that something be given to
his father, master or superior. Similarly, when a magistrate, tutor or curator had
stipulated, the beneficiary would, as in Roman law, acquire an action, if such persons
had stipulated in their capacity as mentioned. From the gloss Supra dictum est ad
Inst. 3.19.19 (see note 72) it follows that they could, unlike procurators, verbally
stipulate in the name of their father, master etc. that something be given to him:
promittis illi quod dabis ei? See § VII of this article (The contract in favour of a third as
source of obligation).
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the Partidas spoke about an acceptance ‘in the name’ of father, master and
superior.
The Partidas do not offer any evidence to suggest that someone who
accepted the promise that something be given to his pupil, principal or
creditor57, by stipulating ‘in the name of the other’ could bring it about that
only the beneficiary was entitled to claim what was promised. As in the ius
commune, in such cases it was the relationship between stipulator and
beneficiary and not the use in the stipulation of the words “who accepts the
promise in the name of the beneficiary” which determined whether the
beneficiary had a claim or not. This leads to the conclusion that the Partidas
do not provide sufficient unambiguous material to support the opinion in the
secondary literature that the Partidas were inclined to acknowledge agency.
Did the ley ‘Paresciendo’ acknowledge direct representation? As we have
seen above, this provision excluded the defence “que fue fecha aescribano
publico oaotra persona priuada en nonbre de otro entre absentes”.
Unfortunately, the subject of this sentence is lacking and has to be supplied.
If one reads here – as De Wet, Núñez Lagos, Arias Bonet and Pérez Martín58
obviously do – the words la obligaçion o el contrato, an obligation between
absent persons (the promisor and the beneficiary) will come into being, if the
obligation is entered into in the name of the beneficiary by (por) a public clerk
or some other person. But the text of the ley ‘Parisciendo’ does not read por
escribano publico o por otra, but aescribano publico oaotra. The sentence only
becomes comprehensible, if we assume the word promise (la promysion) to be
its subject. The promisor cannot block the claim of the beneficiary by stating
that he is not bound to the promise made to a public clerk or to some other
person to the effect that he will give something to the beneficiary who at that
moment was absent. In such a reading, the ley ‘Paresciendo’ does not state
whether or not a direct obligation between promisor and beneficiary will come
into being. To put is differently, one cannot deduce from the text whether the
beneficiary acquires a right without ‘assignment’ of the stipulator’s action. It
is possible to read the text in this way59, but there are no cogent arguments in
57 Partidas 5.11.10 ruled that the promise to give something to the stipulator’s
creditor (en nome de aquel cuyo debtor es) cannot be enforced by the creditor, in whose
name the promise was accepted (en cuyo nome la rescibio). This is explained as follows.
The agreement has no other effect than a stipulation formulated as ‘do you promise me
to give him the money or the object I owe him?’. This promise merely resulted in a
claim for the debtor.
58 Cf., e.g., A. Pérez Martín, ‘Mandato y representación en el derecho histórico’,
Anales de Derecho (Universidad de Murcia) 12 (1994), 205-164, 250: “(...) cuando
establece que la obligación es válida (...) si la obligación se contrajo frente a ‘otra
persona privada en nombre de otro entre absentes’”.
59 Such an interpretation can be found in Gregorio López, gloss Tercera persona ad
Partidas 5.11.7 (Quinta Partida, fol. 63ra): “(...) Posset tamen lege municipali statui,
quod alter alteri posset stipulari et quod acquiratur actio sine cessione, ut notat
Baldus in c. Quae in ecclesiarum col. pe. in prin. de constitu. (X 1.2.7) quod allegat. c.
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favour of so doing. The text does not speak about promises accepted “in the
name of the absent beneficiary”. This leads to the conclusion that the ley
‘Paresciendo’ is not restricted to cases where the stipulator acted on request
(as a direct or indirect representative). It refers to all cases, where it is
stipulated that someting be given to someone else.
6. The unilateral promise as source of obligation
As stated above, the first part of the ley ‘Paresciendo’ dealt with the
situation, where two persons were involved, i.e. the promisor who intended to
bind himself and the beneficiary. It ruled that parties no longer had to come
together in order to conclude a contract or to enter into an obligation. If it
appeared that someone intended to bind himself by means of a promise, a
contract or in any other way, he would be obliged to perform what he
promised to do. This might imply that the unilateral promise (which was not
yet accepted) should be considered a source of obligation. In the sixteenth
century the question arose whether the ley ‘Paresciendo’ should be interpreted
in this way.
According to the ius commune, the promise to a person being absent – the
promise the authors had in mind here was usually the promise to donate
something – would result neither in a civil nor in a natural obligation. In this
respect the jurists seemed to have been in agreement, whereas amongst the
moral theologians there was no unanimity60. The unilateral promise was
defined as the pollicitatio, which the Corpus iuris civilis stated was not
effective61. Since the sources of canon law did not include authoritative texts
on the issue, the canonists followed the opinion of the civilians62.
Quotiens cordis oculus 1. q.7. (C.1 q.7 c.9). Hodie de lege regni huius statutum est in
dicta lege Paresciendo tit. de las excepciones libro. 3 ordi. rega. (Ordenanzas reales
3.8.3) per quam legem etiam directa actio dabitur ei cuius nomine fuit facta promissio,
ut notat Bartolus in l.i. § Sublata in fi. ff. ad Trebell. (D. 36.1.1.3) et uid. per Bal. in l.
Si genero C. de iure dotium (C. 5.12.26)”.
60 Cf. J. Gordley, The philosophical origins of modern contract doctrine (Oxford
1991) 80 ff.
61 Except for the pollicitatio to the municipal community to erect a building or to
pay a certain amount by the one who stood up for an office. This unilateral and
informal promise was of a statutory nature and could be enforced; cf. Ulp. D. 50.12.1pr
and Ulp. D. 50.12.6.1.
62 Nicolaus de Tedeschis taught (ad X 1.35.3) that every promise, including the
pollicitatio or nuda promissio unius, would result in an obligation and that the
magistrate had to see that is performed what was promised. According to C.22 q.5 c.12
for God there is no difference between a simple statement and an oath. In both cases
one commits a sin by not performing what was promised, although the non-observance
of an oath is much more serious. In this passage Tedeschis emphasized the moral
obligation of the promisor and the moral task of the magistrate. It cannot be said for
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An obligation only came into being when both parties consented, i.e. at
the moment when the beneficiary accepted the promise. According to Roman
law, the parties had to come together and observe the oral formalities of the
stipulatio in order to make the promise enforceable. One could not establish a
stipulatio by sending a letter or a messenger (nuntius). Canon law, on the
other hand, did not require that the parties came together. Nor did it require
that they observed the Roman law formalities. However, the mere fact that
someone had been informed that another wanted to grant him a donation, did
not allow him to conclude that such a promise had indeed been made and that
he could accept it. To put it differently, the promisor had to intend that the
promise reach the beneficiary and ensure that appropriate means were
employed to achieve this63.
As seen above, after the promulgation of the Ordenamiento de Alcalá
(1348), in Castile the promise was binding, even if the formalities prescribed
by the law were not observed. The promisor could not block the beneficiary’s
claim by stating that the latter had not been present at the moment the
promise was made. According to Antonio Gómez (saec. XVI), this implied that
even without any acceptance the promisor was bound by his unilateral
statement.
Antonio Gómez, Variae resolutiones, Tom. II, cap. XI, nr. 18
Note well, that nowadays in Castile the unilateral informal promise (nuda
pollicitatio) will give rise to an action deriving from the ley ‘Paresciendo’ and
that the entire Digest title concerning pollicitationes has been corrected64.
When the ley ‘Paresciendo’ is interpreted in this way, the unilateral
promise was in Castile regarded as binding and it was impossible to revoke it.
According to Gómez, this goes further than canon law which did not grant an
action on the grounds of a unilateral statement65. This idea, viz. that the
sure whether he regarded the pollicitatio as the source of a legal obligation. Cf.
Panormitanus, Secunda pars super primo Decretalium (Lyons 1534) fol. 132vb.
63 Cf. L. Molina, De iustitia et iure, II (Venice 1614), disp. 264, nr. 1 (30); Leonardus
Lessius (1554-1623), De iustitia et iure (Brescia 1697), Lib. II, cap. 18, dub. 6, nr. 34 ff.
(174); these authors required that the promise was delivered by a letter or messenger
to the beneficiary in person, who had to reply in a similar way.
64 Antonius Gomezius, Variae resolutiones, II, cap. XI, nr. 18 (in the edition Opera
Omnia, Pars I, Antwerp 1693, p. 248-249): “(...) sed etiam quando simpliciter et nuda
pollicitatione quis promittit absenti, ita aperte disponit praedicta lex (sc. Paresciendo)
ex qua bene nota, quod hodie in nostro regno ex nuda pollicitatione oritur actio et
corrigitur totus titulus de pollicitationibus”. For this opinion of Gómez Luis Molina
also refers to Tom. II, cap. IV, nr. 3 and Tom. II, cap. IX, nr. 3. Cf. Molina, De iustitia
et iure, disp. 263 n. 9 (25).
65 Gomezius, Variae resolutiones, Tom. II, cap. IX, nr. 1 ( 213); Molina, De iustitia et
iure, disp. 263, nr. 9 (265).
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unilateral promise would result in an obligation, was also defended by a
number of other authors, albeit merely concerning Castile, not other regions66.
Gregorio López de Tovar (1496-1560), Diego Covarruvias y Leyva (1512-
1577) and Juan Gutiérrez (1535-1618) interpreted the ley ‘Paresciendo’ in
conformity with canon law. In their view the ley ‘Paresciendo’ did not imply
more than it explicitly stated, viz. that there were no legal formalities to be
observed when making a promise and that the promise might be accepted
later and in a different place. In this interpretation the promise to give
something to the other party constituted an offer, which the beneficiary could
accept. If he did so, the parties entered into an obligation. The lawgiver
intended to abolish the formalities of the Roman stipulatio. He did not intend
to derogate from the rule that the consent of both parties is needed. Parties
could enter into an obligation without coming together. In that case the
obligation came into being at the moment the beneficiary accepted the
promise67. Until the promise was accepted, it could be revoked. The lawgiver
66 According to Luis Molina, Rodrigo Xuárez, Diego Pérez de Salamanca and Pedro
de Dueñas endorsed this view. Cf. Molina, De iustitia et iure, disp. 263, nr. 9 (25) and
Ludovicus Molina, De Hispanorum primogeniorum origine ac natura libri quatuor
(Cologne 1605), Lib. IV, c. 2, nr. 59 (461). For the opinion of Diego Pérez, Molina
referred to his commentary on the Ordenanzas reales de Castilla. However, what
Diego Pérez there emphasized was the moral obligation resulting from the promise. He
considered it a sin if the promisor did not resign himself to his statement and revoked
the promise before it was accepted. But for the existence of a legal obligation Diego
Pérez required consent between parties. Cf. Didacus Perez, Commentaria in quatuor
priores libros ordinationum regni Castellae (Salamanca 1575), ad Ordenanzas reales
3.8.3, nr. 8 (612): “(...) contractus enim non potest esse sine aliquo medio coniungente
uoluntatem contrahentium, puta nuntius uel epistola. (...) Sed in pollicitatione nullum
istorum interuenit, cum fiat absenti, uel presenti non consentienti, ergo non est
contractus, ex quo producatur obligatio naturalis seu actio aduersus promissorem. Nec
obstat lex ista, dicens ‘o en otra manera’ nam est dicendum scilicet similis
superioribus, et sic obligatoria”. According to Paul Scholten (1875-1946), Antoine
Favre (1557-1624) considered the unilateral promise to be binding. Acceptance was not
required. Cf. P. Scholten, ‘Het beding ten behoeve van derden; Historische
interpretatie’, in G.J. Scholten e.a. (eds), Verzamelde geschriften van Prof. Mr. Paul
Scholten, deel IV (Zwolle 1954) 268-290, especially p. 275: “Aanneming door den
begiftigde acht hij (sc. Favre) niet noodig”. Scholten referred here to décade 47.2.
Probably the fragment is based on Antonius Faber, Pars secunda de erroribus
pragmaticorum et interpretum iuris (Genova 1622), Decadis XLVII, error 2, nr. 4
(1132), where Favre stated that the action of the donee is not based on a cession or on
the stipulation by the notary in his favour, but on Justinian’s constitution C.
8.53(54).35.5a. However, previous to this passage (in Decadis XLVII, error 2, nr. 3, p.
1132), Favre had explained that the third beneficiary had to ratify the notary’s
stipulation in order to acquire an action, although the donor was no longer capable of
revoking the promise he had made in the notary’s presence.
67 Cf. Didacus Covarruvias y Leyva, Relectio c. Quamvis de pact. lib. 6 (VI. 1.18.2),
pars 2, § IV, nr. 25 (edition Opera omnia, Tom. I, Antwerp 1638, p. 296): “His accedit,
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had no intention of derogating from the rule that a promise to grant a
donation could be revoked by the donor, until this promise was accepted by
the beneficiary68.
Although Luis Molina (1535-1600) was inclined to follow the reasoning of
Covarruvias, he maintained that the promise to donate, at any rate in Castile,
resulted in an obligation and could not be revoked. He reasoned as follows:
According to the ley ‘Paresciendo’ the promisor is bound, if it appears he
intended to obligate himself to another through a promise, a contract or in
some other manner. Thus, the promise must be regarded as a separate legal
act, not a kind of contract. If someone wanted to donate something, his
intention was not dependent on the beneficiary’s acceptance. The promise
itself clearly indicated that he wanted to bind himself to the other. Learned
law might deny that the promise itself was binding and consider the donation
to be revocable, but particular, local law could deviate from this view. There
were no grounds to assume that the ley ‘Paresciendo’ had merely abrogated
the formalities of the stipulatio, and not the requirement that the promise had
to be accepted69.
quod ex unius promissione absenti facta nihil ei quaeritur et potest reuocari promissio.
(...) et fortassis etiam l. Regia premissa que tertia est tit. 8 lib. 3 ordin. (Ordenanzas
reales 3.8.3) non esset admittenda opinio prior contra communem, si consideremus
eam constitutionem tractare de ea promissione, quae absentis sit utilitate, alicui
tamen presenti. Aliis uidebitur, et id iure aequissimo, lege Regia probari priorem
Abbatis opinionem et ex ea dari actionem pollicitationi, naturalemque obligationem
oriri”. Cf. also note 79. In his commentary on Nueva Recopilación 5.16.2 Gutiérrez
maintained that until the donation was accepted, it could be revoked; see Joannes
Gutierrez, Practicarum quaestionum civilium liber III, IV & V, (Antwerp 1618), Lib. V,
quaestio 96, nr. 6 (302), see also Lib. V, quaestio 97. nr. 7 (303-304). In his consilium
20, nr. 1-2 Gutiérrez disagreed with the opinion of Gómez, Pérez de Salamanca and
Dueñas (the donation cannot be revoked) and with the opinion of Jacobo de Villapando
(no acceptance is required); see Joannes Gutierrez, Consiliorum sive responsorum
volumen unum (Antwerp 1618) 74. In his consilium 41 nr. 13 he maintained that even
if statutory law prescribes that one will acquire an obligation through another, it is
still required that the promise be accepted by the absent beneficiary; see Gutierrez,
Consiliorum... volumen unum,74: “(...) quia licet statuto caueatur, ut alteri per alterum
acquiratur obligatio, illud tamen intelligitur ac procedit interueniente absentis
acceptatione (...)”, with references to Paulus de Castro († 1441) and Phillipus Decius
(1454-1536).
68 Except for the case where the donor had indicated in his promise, that he was not
going to revoke it. In such a case it was clear that he wanted to bind himself through
the promise. Cf. Molina, De iustitia et iure, disp. 263, nr. 9 (265) and Gregorio López,
the gloss No lo puede fazer ad Partidas 5.4.4 (Quinta Partida, fol. 11rb). However, in
his gloss Gran pro ad Partidas 5.11.1 (Quinta Partida, fol. 61ra) López stated, that in
Castile the unilateral promise gave rise to an action.
69 Cf. Molina, De iustitia et iure, disp. 263, nr. 9 (25-26): “(...) Iuxta haec, licet
quondam in Couarruuiae opinionem proponderim, modo tamen plus in aliorum
opinionem inclino, ... quoniam id perspicue lex illa significat et quoties in ea mentio sit
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7. The contract in favour of a third party as source of obligation
As just seen, the scholars of the sixteenth century disagreed with each
other about the question regarding the effects which, in Castile, should be
ascribed to the promise made to an absent beneficiary. Where this promise
was accepted by someone else, i.e. some other than the beneficiary himself,
there seems to have been more unanimity, albeit based on divergent grounds.
Antonio Gómez, who defended the argument that in Castile the promise
to an absent beneficiary even without acceptance was binding, also logically
assumed that this was the case, if another, being present at the moment the
promise to the absent beneficiary was made, had accepted it. For promises to
an absent person to be enforceable, Castilian law no longer required that
these promises were made in the presence of his son, slave, tutor, curator or
in the presence of the personero of the administrative authorities.
Gómez introduced a distinction which was not yet known in the ley
‘Paresciendo’. According to Gómez, the latter provision would only apply,
when the promise was formulated in the same way as was the stipulation: do
you promise Titius (the one absent) to give to him (...)? In this wording of the
stipulation, the promise to give something to the third party, was formulated
as addressed to the absent beneficiary himself, although the promise was
accepted by a stipulator not mentioned in the formula. In this case the
beneficiary would, according to Gómez, have a direct action against the
promisor. On the other hand, if the promise to give something to an absent
beneficiary was worded as addressed to the stipulator, the beneficiary would
have no direct action. This promise (do you promise me to give (...) to Titius?),
would result in an obligation between promisor and stipulator. The absent
beneficiary could merely enforce performance by the promisor, if the
stipulator authorized him to sue the promisor in his place. Gómez mentioned
two categories of such stipulators to whom the promise could be addressed,
viz. the beneficiary’s procurator and the manager of the beneficiary’s affairs.
Such persons had to ‘assign’ their action to the their principal70.
contractus adiungitur uerbum o obligacion, que ex simili promissione et ex quouis alio
capite profiscitur”.
70 The opinion of Gómez was followed by Alfonso de Olea (saec. XVII) and José
Fernández de Retes (saec. XVII). Cf. Alphonsus de Olea, Tractatus de cessione iurium
et actionum (Venice 1664), Tit. IV, quaestio 9, nr. 41 (142) and Josephus Fernandez de
Retes, Repetita praelectio ad titulum Dig. de verborum obligationibus, Pars I,
Tractatus II, Consectarium VI (§ 42), Novus Thesaurus juris civilis et canonici, VII
(The Hague 1753) 397. Müller, Die Entwicklung, maintained (74 and footnote 4)
erroneously that the opinion of Gómez was followed by Francisco Ramos del Manzano
(† 1683), thereby referring to H. Buchka, Die Lehre von der Stelvertretung bei
Eingehung von Verträgen; Historisch un dogmatisch dargestellt (Rostock-Schwerin
1852). Buchka, however (157 and footnote 15), in this respect did not refer to Ramos
del Manzano, but to the passage by Fernández de Retes just mentioned.
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Antonio Gómez, Variae resolutiones, Tom. II, cap. XI, nr. 18
Moreover, the afore-mentioned lex Regia should be understood [to apply],
when the words of the promise are addressed to the absent person; it is quite
different, however, if they are addressed to the procurator or the manager of
the other’s affairs, because I believe that in such cases if the engagement is
broken a cession is required71.
The distinction Antonio Gómez employed here was derived from learned
law. This has to be explained more fully. In answering the stipulator’s
question, a promisor would always promise someone to perform something for
someone. Normally these ‘someones’ were one and the same person. The
stipulator accepted a promise addressed to himself that something was to be
performed for him. In legal scholarship the part of the stipulation, which
indicated to whom the promise was made, was termed verba promissoria,
whereas the part of the stipulation, containing what had to be given or done
and to whom, was termed verba executoria. As a basic rule for stipulations, it
was held that the verba promissoria should be addressed to the stipulator
himself. A stipulatio inter absentes was ineffective. In principle also the verba
executoria should mention the stipulator as beneficiary – this followed from
the maxim alteri stipulari nemo potest – but, as we have seen, the verba
executoria could mention another person instead, if the stipulator had an
actionable interest in the performance.
From Accursius’ gloss Supra dictum est ad Inst. 3.19.1972 it followed that
there were also exceptions to the first principle, viz. that the verba promis-
71 Antonius Gomezius, Variae resolutiones, II, Cap. XI, nr. 18, Opera Omnia, Pars I,
(Antwerp 1693) 248-249: “Item adde, quod praedicta lex Regia debet intelligi, quando
verba promissionis diriguntur in tertium absentem; secus vero, si dirigantur in
personam procuratoris, vel negotiorum gestoris, quia tunc credo quod requiritur cessio
rupta conclusione”.
72 Accursius, the gloss Supra dictum est ad Inst. 3.19.19: “supra eod. § Si quis alii
(Inst. 3.19.4). Hoc tamen fallit in multis casibus ut ibi diximus. Et nota quod hic tribus
modis alteri stipulamur. Nam interdum directam acquirimus actionenem, subaudi
alteri stipulando, ut filius patri, seruus domino et econtra. ut supra eod. § Si quis alii
et § Ei uero qui (Inst. 3.19.4), quandoque utilem ut tutor pupillo et in similibus ratione
officii, ut seruus publicus ut ff. de consti. pec. l. Eum qui § pen. (D. 13.5.5.9) et ff. rem
pu. sal. fo. l.iiii. (D. 46.6.4); interdum nullam acquirimus actionem, et tunc necessaria
est poena, ut hic dicitur. Item nota quod hoc ultimo casu uerba stipulationis et sortis et
poene possunt formari tribus modis. Aut enim sic dico promittis mihi quod dabis illi et
eodem modo poenam? aut sic promittis illi, quod dabis ei et eodem modo poenam? Et in
his duobus casibus non ualet neque sortis neque poene promissio. Sed aliud quando
deberet utilis uel directa acquiri, ut in primis duobus casibus. ut ff. de constit. pec. l.
Eum § Si actori (D. 13.5.5.9) et § Iulianus (D. 13.5.5.1) et hic. aut sic promittis mihi
quod dabis illi aut penam mihi, tantum stipulor, quia et tunc habet locum quod hic
dicitur. aut quarto modo dico, promittis quod dabis mihi recipienti nomine eius? quo
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soria had to contain the name of the stipulator. In instances where a
beneficiary could acquire a direct action, i.e. an action other than one
‘assigned to him’ by the stipulator, the verba promissoria might also mention
the name of the beneficiary himself. The situations, in which this was the
case, were enumerated in another gloss referred to by Accursius, the gloss
Nihil agit ad Inst. 3.19.4. The main categories have been discussed above, viz.
stipulations by a son, slave or conventual, stipulations by magistrates, the
actor municipum, a curator and a tutor. The gloss Supra dictum est ad Inst.
3.19.19 also dealt with the phrasing of the stipulation to be used in the
exceptional cases. When a son stipulated for his father, a tutor for his pupil,
an actor municipum for his municipium etc., in short in all cases where the
Corpus iuris granted the third party a claim, it did not matter which person
was mentioned in the verba promissoria. A son could stipulate: do you promise
me to give to Titius (my father)?, but also: do you promise Titius (my father)
to give to him73? However, in case of a stipulatio alteri by an extraneus, not
belonging to the categories just mentioned (son, slave, conventual, etc.), the
verba promissoria had to contain the name of the stipulator, the verba
executoria the name of the third person, the beneficiary. Even this was not
sufficient. If the extraneus wanted his stipulatio alteri to have some effect, he
had two options, viz. the addition of a stipulatio poenae and the use of a
different, very specific phrasing of the stipulation. In case of a stipulatio
poenae, the verba promissoria had to mention the stipulator (the extraneus),
the verba executoria had to contain an alternative performance mentioning
the name of the third person as regards the performance to give something
and the name of the stipulator (the extraneus) as regards the payment of a
penalty in the eventuality of the performance to the third person failing to
occur (do you promise me, to give (...) to Titius or to pay a penalty of (...) to
me?). Having used this formula, the stipulator himself could claim the poena,
if performance did not take place. If formulated differently, the stipulatio
alteri would have no effect. Apart from adding a penalty-clause in the
stipulatio alteri, the extraneus could also use the phrasing: do you promise to
me, who accepts (this promise) in the name of Titius, to give him (...)74? In
such a case the extraneus acquired an action which he had to ‘assign’ to the
third party. It is doubtful, though, whether every extraneus was entitled to
use this formula, including those without any actionable interest who were
stipulating for a third person out of mere generosity. In Roman law, such
persons, lacking an actionable interest would have no action at their disposal.
A later additio to the gloss Supra dictum est ad Inst. 3.19.19 explained what
the Gloss intended here. The specific formula was not meant to be used by
casu ualet utrunque et ego illi cedam cuius nomine stipulatus sum. ut ff. mandat. Si
procur. § fin. (D. 17.1.8.10)”.
73 Ankum did not take notice of this exception to the principal rule alteri stipulari
nemo potest. Cf. Ankum, De voorouders 18.
74 On this stipulation see also § V above (Direct representation acknowledged?).
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each and every extraneus, but only by procurators acting on the instructions of
their principal and managers of the principal’s affairs, acting at their own
initiative75.
According to learned law, an extraneus could not stipulate that something
be given to a third party, if the verba promissoria mentioned the third party’s
name. According to Gómez, however, in Castile such a stipulation was allowed
and even resulted in a direct action for the absent beneficiary in order to
enforce what was promised. The reason was presumably that every promise to
an absent person is binding. If, on the other hand, the promise to give to the
third party was worded as addressed to the stipulator (i.e. the verba
promissoria contained his name), according to Gómez the ley ‘Paresciendo’ did
not apply. Obviously in such cases the ius commune was applicable.
From the gloss Supra dictum est ad Inst. 3.19.19 Gómez argued that the
verba promissoria can be worded in two different ways, viz. as a promise to
the stipulator and as a promise to the third party. Moreover, he developed
these two formulations into two fundamentally different categories of promise.
According to the ius commune, it was the relationship between the stipulator
and the beneficiary which determined whether or not the beneficiary had an
action. In the situation where the third party acquired an action (the father of
a stipulating son, the master of a stipulating slave, etc.), it did not matter
whether the promise was worded as addressed to the stipulator or as
addressed to the third party. In Castile, on the other hand, at any rate
according Antonio Gómez, every promise in favour of a third party would be
effective, but the precise consequence of the promise was dependent on the
verba promissoria. If they contained the name of the absent beneficiary, he
himself had the direct action. If they contained the name of the stipulator,
this stipulator had at his disposal an action, which he had to ‘assign’ to the
third party.
Through a different kind of reasoning Diego Covarruvias y Leyva came to
a similar conclusion. As stated above, he taught that the ley ‘Paresciendo’
implied that the promise to an absent beneficiary became enforceable at the
moment it was accepted. He acknowledged the pact (pactum) as a source of
obligation, not the unilateral statement (pollicitatio). If the beneficiary was
able to enforce the performance after accepting it, what was the effect when
someone else accepted in his place? According to Covarruvias such an
acceptance made the promise irrevocable.
The arguments for this view were derived from the doctrines of the
commentators concerning a certain kind of the so-called donatio sub modo: a
75 Thereby referring to Johannes Faber († c. 1340) and Angelus de Ubaldis (1328-
1417); cf. Institutionum (...) libri quatuor (Lyons 1550) 169: “Et hoc est uerum, siue sim
procurator habens mandatum siue negotiorum gestor, siue saltem generalis, ut mihi
acquiram et postea cedam, sicut procurator cum ratihabitione etc. ut l. fina. C. ad
Macedonia. (C. 4.28.7) et l. Si ego ff. de nego. gest. (D. 3.5.23(24)) ut per Ioan. Fab. et
Angelum hic”.
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donor donates a certain thing to a donee, while prescribing that after a certain
lapse of time (or when a certain condition is met) the donated object shall be
acquired by a third party. According to C. 8.54(55).3, the third party has an
action against the donee to enforce his right. This constitution from the Codex
Justinianus in some degree resembled the ley ‘Paresciendo’. According to C.
8.54(55).3 it was not necessary for the absent beneficiary to be present at the
moment of the donation in order to acquire a right against the donee, just as
in Castilian law the beneficiary could be absent when something was
promised to him. The absent beneficiary (in the ius commune the beneficiary
of the modus, in Castilian law the beneficiary of the promise) could therefore
acquire a claim without ‘assignment’. What was the source of this obligation?
From the modus (restriction) attached to the donation – Covarruvias termed
it the condition or pact attached to the contract of donation between donor and
donee76 – it appeared that the donor had wanted to grant the third party a
right and indeed this right was acquired at the moment the third party
ratified the act in his favour.
In order to make the modus enforceable, it was not necessary that it was
laid down in the form of a stipulatio by a notary, but what would be the effect
if this nevertheless occurred? According to Covarruvias this would make the
modus, which in principle was revocable, irrevocable77. This idea was derived
from Jason de Maino (1435-1519). Jason taught that the modus could not be
withdrawn, if at the moment the donation took place it had already been
accepted by the notary, the donee or someone else for the absent beneficiary or
76 Didacus Covarruvias y Leyva, Variarum resolutionum Lib. I, cap. 14, nr. 11,
Opera omnia, II (Antwerp 1638) 72: “Quarto praemissa d.l. Quoties (C. 8.54(55).3) uera
interpretatione, ut modus appositus donationi in fauorem tertii ualidus omnino
censeatur, etiamsi id pactum eaue conditio a nemine absentis nomine acceptata fuerit,
ut Iason explicat in d. § Flauius (D. 45.1.122.2) nr. 22. (...)”. It may be noted, that
Andrea Fachinei († 1607) considered Covarruvias’ teachings on the donatio sub modo
in chapter 14 of the Variorum resolutionum Lib. I too complicated to deal with. Cf.
Andreas Fachineus, Controversiarum iuris libri decem (Cologne 1604), Liber VIII, cap.
89, 273.
77 Covarruvias referred to the commentary of Bartolus de Saxoferrato (1313-1357)
on D. 45.1.122.2. Cf. Bartholus de Saxoferrato, Commentaria, VI (Venice 1526; reprint
Rome 1996), fol. 49va. Bartolus dealt in this passage with the question whether
someone who donated a plot of land to another under the modus that this plot of land
after a lapse of time should belong to the Church, could withdraw the modus. Bartolus
came to the conclusion that the donor is indeed entitled to do so. He found his main
argument in D. 18.7.3. This text prescribed that when a slave was sold under the
condition that after a certain period he had to be manumitted, this slave would be a
free man, even when no manumission had taken place, if at least the vendor persisted
in his desire that the slave should be free. From the latter requirement it was
apparently deduced that the vendor could change his mind until the moment the
prescribed period had lapsed.
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in the name of this beneficiary78. According to Covarruvias, King Alfonso XI
prescribed two things in the ley ‘Paresciendo’. Firstly, one can acquire an
obligation through (the acts of) another person, even if the formalities of the
Roman stipulatio were not observed, and, in the second place, the promise to
an absent beneficiary is effective, even if this promise was not accepted by
someone in the name of the absent beneficiary, provided that it is clear that
the promisor had the intention of binding himself79. However, what would be
the effect of the stipulator’s acceptance of the promise? And should the absent
beneficiary also express his consent?
Covarruvias, Variarum resolutionum Lib. I, cap. 14, nr. 13
 (...) This must be understood even without ‘cession’, at least provided that the
promise is followed by an acceptance or ratification [by the absent
beneficiary]. If this has not yet taken place, no action is acquired, and, based
on the foregoing, this obligation is not considered to be suitable for bringing
actions, although it cannot be revoked, in particular where the contract or
donation had been accepted in the name of the absent person by a notary,
official or private person, who according to the ius commune or particular law
has the competence so to do80.
It may seem here, as if the beneficiary, who was absent at the moment
the promise was made, even without any ‘assignment’ (sine cessione) acquired
an action, as soon as he accepted the promise81. That was indeed the case, if
78 In such cases the beneficiary had entered into a contract with the donor as
through a servant (minister). Cf. Iason de Maino, In secundam digesti novi partem
commentaria (Venice 1590), ad D. 45.1.22.2 n. 19 (fol. 138vb): “Secundo limita nisi
notarius uel ipsemet donatarius uel alius tertius tempore dicto donationis recepisset
talem donationem stipulando pro ecclesia seu nomine ecclesiae, tunc non posset
donans reuocare, quia tunc ecclesia intelligitur per ministrum contrahere et sic
mediante facto suo sibi acquirere, ergo ea inuita non potest habere locum penitentia”.
79 Covarruvias, Variarum resolutionum Lib. I, cap. 14, nr. 13 (73): “Ex quo infertur
uerus intellectus ad Regiam constitutionem quae 3. est tit. 8 lib. 3 ordinationum
(Ordenanzas reales 3.8.3) qua rex Alfonsus XI (...) sanciuit alteri per alterum in hoc
regno, etiam absque ulla stipulationis solemnitate, obligationem acquiri absentique
promissionem fieri posse cum effectu, etiam nemine absentis nomine acceptante, modo
animus obligandi appareat”.
80 Covarruvias, Variarum resolutionum Lib. I, cap. 14, nr. 13 (73): “(...) Id enim
intelligendum est, etiam sine cessione, dum tamen ratihabitio aut acceptatio secuta
fuerit; ea etenim nondum secuta, nec actio quaeritur nec illa obligatio firma ad
agendum sine cessione censetur ex praemissis, tametsi reuocari non possit. Praesertim
ubi notarius, publica uel periuata persona, quae iure communi, uel speciali possit id
agere, nomine absentis contractum uel donationem acceptauerit”.
81 De Wet apparently reads: sine cessione per alterum, although the text merely
states: sine cessione. Cf. De Wet, Die ontwikkeling 92: “Uit hierdie lex lei hy af dat een
persoon “sine cessione per alterum” kan verkry, d.w.s. deur middel van ‘n
vertegenwoordiger”.
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the promise had not yet been accepted previously by someone else in his
name. Acceptance by the beneficiary would then make the promise irrevocable
and enforceable. The underlying thought was probably that only consent
between parties can give rise to an obligation. As shown in the previous
paragraph, this interpretation of the ley ‘Paresciendo’ was in conformity with
canon law. Did the beneficiary also acquire a claim without ‘assignment’, if
the promise was accepted by someone else, who was present at the moment it
was made? This would seem to be the case for two reasons. In the first place,
as mentioned above, the beneficiary acquired a direct claim, if he accepted the
promise that something would be given to him, if this promise had not
previously been accepted by someone else. Why should we come to a different
conclusion, if the promise had already been accepted by another? In the
second place, Covarruvias saw an analogy between C. 8.54(55).3 and the ley
‘Paresciendo’. According to this constitution (C. 8.54(55).3), acceptance by
another (the notary) did not result in the acquisition of a right. The mere
result was that an act, viz. the donor’s decision, became irrevocable. Similarly,
in the case of the ley’ Paresciendo’ it would be the promisor’s decision which
became irrevocable.
However, this is not the reasoning we find in Covarruvias, who obviously
drew a different analogy between the donatio sub modo and the stipulatio
alteri as one of his premises. He seems to be comparing the decision of the
donor in the case of donatio sub modo, viz. that the beneficiary would acquire
the donated object after a lapse of time, to the stipulator’s decision in the case
of the ley ‘Paresciendo’, viz. to accept that the promisor will give something to
the beneficiary. This reasoning can be derived from what Covarruvias stated
in one his other works, viz. his commentary on the capitulum ‘Quamuis’ in the
Liber Sextus (VI. 1.18.2). There what the beneficiary accepted, was not the
promise. Rather he accepted what the stipulator had done in his interest, by
giving consent to the stipulation. This acceptance did not immediately result
in the acquisition of an action. The only consequence was that after the
beneficiary’s acceptance the stipulator was held to ‘assign’ his remedy to the
beneficiary. According to Covarruvias, the ley ‘Paresciendo’ had to be
understood in this way82.
82 Covarruvias, Relectio c. Quamuis de pact. lib. 6, pars 2, § IV, nr. 13 (294): “Ipse
opinor iure pontificis alteri per alterum posse stipulari uerbis promissionis in
praesentem directis, secundum auctoritatem glosae et eorum qui eam sequuntur in
dicto capitulo Quoties cordis oculis (C.1 q.7 c.9). Et praeterea ratione, quod iure
canonico ex pacto nudo actio oriatur. cap. i de pactis (X 1.35.1) atque ideo ob eamdem
aequitatem haec stipulatio erit iure pontificis admittenda in hoc sensu, ut ualida sit et
secuta absentis acceptatione, eiusque praestito consensu teneatur praesens stipulator
ei actionem cedere. Sic etenim intelligo glossam in d. cap. Quoties (C.1 q.7 c.9) ex his,
quae ipse adnotaui in d. c. 14 lib. 1 Variar. resolut. num. 13 (Variarum resolutionum
Liber I, cap. 14, nr. 13). Idemque et Iure Regio respondendum erit propter l.3 titul. 8
lib. 3 Ordina. (Ordenanzas reales 3.8.3)”.
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Covarruvias did not draw a distinction, as Gómez did, between promises
in words addressed to the stipulator and promises in words addressed to the
absent beneficiary. Covarruvias considered it only possible to make a promise
addressed to the stipulator, as did the ius commune.
8. Grotius
At the end of chapter XI (De promissis) of the Second Book of De iure belli
ac pacis, Grotius discusses situations in which someone not being the
beneficiary has accepted a promise. In such a case three persons are involved:
the promisor, the stipulator – Grotius speaks about the one who accepts – and
the beneficiary. Before dealing with this case, Grotius discusses more
generally the question of the effect of promises. There he posed the same
questions as late scholastic authors: does the beneficiary derive a right from
the promise itself? Can the promised be revoked?
(i) The promise as source of obligation in the works of Grotius
It should be noted that in De iure belli ac pacis Grotius, as regards
statements that something will be done in the future, made a distinction
between three degrees. The first was nothing more than the expression of the
actual state of mind which might or might not change in the future. The
second was the pollicitatio, the statement in which the promisor clearly (signo
sufficiente, with an adequate sign) indicated that he was not going to retract
his promise in the future. Such a promise was – if we disregard positive law –
 binding, but not enforceable. If the promisor fulfilled his promise, the
recipient was entitled to retain what he received, but natural law could not
force the promisor to abide by his word83. The third degree was the so-called
promissio (perfecta), by which the promisor indicated – again by means of a
sign – that he intended to grant the beneficiary a right. This promise could be
accepted by the beneficiary, who at the moment of acceptance acquired the
right. Until that moment it could be revoked.
Grotius did not explain what we should understand by the term ‘sign’
(signum) with which someone indicated his intention to grant another a right.
He did point out that “in the nature of things there are other signs that
someone has made up his mind, apart from stipulation or something similar
83 Cf. Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis, Lib. II, cap. xi, § 3 (329): “(...) Et haec
pollicitatio dici potest, quae seposita lege ciuili obligat quidem, (...) sed ius proprium
alteri non dat. Multis enim casibus euenit, ut obligatio sit in nobis, et nullum ius in
alio (...). Itaque ex tali pollicitatione res pollicitantis retineri, aut is ipse qui pollicitus
est ad implendam fidem cogi iure naturae non poterit”.
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required by positive law to give rise to an action” 84. Following Covarruvias,
Grotius maintained that the beneficiary had to accept the promise in order to
acquire the right. It cannot be maintained that according to nature the mere
act of the promisor, i.e. his statement, would suffice85.
(ii) The promise accepted by one other than the beneficiary
Acceptance of the promise by the beneficiary also appears to be relevant
where the beneficiary was absent at the moment the promise was made, and
another accepted it. Concerning this situation, Grotius drew a distinction
which is reminiscent of the ways in which, according to Gómez, the promise
could be formulated. In the first place, Grotius mentioned the promise made
to the stipulator who was present. Secondly, there was the promise worded as
addressed to the absent beneficiary86. Modern literature is inclined to identify
this difference with the distinction between the promise accepted by the
stipulator in his own name and the promise accepted by the stipulator in the
name of the beneficiary87. In modern law, the latter distinction constitutes the
84 Cf. Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis, Lib. II, cap. xi § 4 [3] (330): “Possunt autem
naturaliter deliberati animi alia esse signa praeter stipulationem, aut si quid ei simile
ad actionem pariendam lex ciuilis postulat (...)”. See also F. Dovring - H.F.W.D.
Fischer - E.M. Meijers (eds), Hugo de Groot, Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechts-
Geleerdheid (Leyden 1965), Boek III, deel I, § 49 ( 202), where Grotius used the terms
“uitdruckelicke toezegging” and “toezegging door wetduiding”. The latter covered,
according to Grotius, the obligations positive law attached to contract, guardianship,
unauthorized administration, etc. The “uitdruckelicke toezegging” could be expressed
orally and in writing (Inleidinge Boek III, deel I, § 50, p. 202). In Holland there existed
no formal requirements. Neither was it necessary that parties came together
(Inleidinge Boek III, deel I, § 52, p. 203). Cf. about these texts R. Feenstra, ‘Die
Klagbarkeit der nuda pacta’, R. Feenstra-R. Zimmermann (eds), Das römisch-
holländische Recht, Fortschritte des Zivilrechts im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert (Schriften
zur Europäischen Rechts- und Verfassungsgeschichte 7; Berlin 1992) 123-144,
especially 136.
85 Cf. Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis, Lib. II, cap. xiv, § 14 ( 335-336): “(...) Ut autem
promissio ius transferat, acceptatio hic non minus quam in dominii translatione
requiritur (...)”; cf. also Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechts-Geleerdheid, Boek III, deel
1, § 10 (195-196).
86 Cf. Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis, Lib. II, cap. xi, § 18 [1] (337): “Solent et
controuersiae incidere de acceptatione pro altero facta: in quibus distinguendum est
inter promissionem mihi factam de re danda alteri, et inter promissionem in ipsius
nomen collatam cui res danda est”.
87 Cf. Müller, Die Entwicklung 128 stated: “Für ihn (sc. Grotius) stellte sich
nunmehr die Frage, da er sich nicht mehr an das Prinzip des alteri stipulari gebunden
fühlte, ein ganz anderes Problem, nämlich, welche Rechtsfolgen sich im einzelnen aus
dem Auftreten des Annehmenden ergeben sollten”. We still followed this view, albeit
erroneously, in H. Dondorp - J. Hallebeek, ‘Het derdenbeding bij Voorda en Moltzer’,
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basis for distinguishing between contract in favour of a third party and
agency. If it is clear to both parties that the stipulator has received no
mandate, he will act in his own name and enter into a contract in favour of
the third party. If, on the other hand, the stipulator indicates that he is acting
in his capacity as representative of the third party and he has received a
mandate, we speak about direct representation. However, such a distinction
between acceptance in one’s own name and acceptance in the name of a third
party cannot yet be found in Grotius.
First we will examine the second category mentioned, thereafter we will
deal with the promise made to the stipulator who is present. According to
Grotius, where the promise was formulated as addressed to the absent
beneficiary, the question whether the stipulator, who accepted the promise,
had received a mandate or not was of the utmost importance88. If he accepted
with a mandate, the beneficiary acquired the right (puto promissionem
perfici).
Deviating from Roman law, Grotius maintained that not only slaves for
their masters, sons for their fathers, etc. but anyone who received a mandate
could accept a promise worded as addressed to the absent beneficiary (i.e.
when the verba promissoria or verba promissionis mentioned the latter’s
name). In such cases the beneficiary acquired a right through an
intermediary. He was presumed to endorse the decision taken by the
intermediary he had appointed. This construction came very close89 to direct
representation in the modern sense: the act of the representative who accepts
the promise worded as addressed to the absent beneficiary, is considered to be
that of the latter, the principal. The acceptance by the intermediary directly
and exclusively produced certain legal consequences for this absent principal,
because the promise is addressed to the latter and not to the intermediary90.
For this line of reasoning there were, indeed, certain starting points in the ius
commune91, but the idea that the absent beneficiary could use anyone – not
Pro Memorie; Bijdragen tot de rechtsgeschiedenis der Nederlanden 4.1 (2002) 49-67,
note 33 on 58-59.
88 Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis, Lib. II, cap. xi, § 18 [2] (338): “Quod si promissio in
nomen eius collata est cui danda est res, distinguendum est an qui acceptat, aut
speciale mandatum habeat acceptandi, aut ita generale ut talis acceptatio ei inclusa
censeri debeat, an uero non habeat.”.
89 Cf. Müller, Die Entwicklung 131: “[E]r kam der Figur der direkten
Stellvertretung sehr Nahe”. To the differences depicted by Müller, it should be added
that Grotius did not distinguished between acceptance in one’s own name and
acceptance in the name of the other.
90 It does not follow from the text that the intermediary accepted “im fremden
Namen” as stated by Müller, Die Entwicklung 130.
91 Some commentators considered consensual contracts, made by one’s procurator,
as entered into through a messenger (nuntius), although in case of stipulations this
only held true, if the principal had been present. Only in such a case the procurator
could stipulate: do you promise Titius (his principal who was present) to give him? Cf.
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just his son, slave, etc. – as intermediary, was novel. In the ius commune an
extraneus could not stipulate: do you promise Titius (the absent beneficiary) to
give him? Nor could he enter into a different contract in the name of the
beneficiary, in such a way that the name of the mandator was inserted in the
instrument as a party to the contract.
Subsequently Grotius dealt with the instance, where someone accepted
the promise worded as addressed to a third beneficiary, albeit without any
mandate for doing so. To put it differently, someone stipulated, at his own
initiative, that something be given to the absent beneficiary and the promise
was worded as addressed to this absent person92. In the ius commune this
stipulation (do you promise Titius to give him?) would be ineffective, both for
the stipulator (who accepted it) and the beneficiary (who ratified it)93.
According to the ius commune the promisor could retract his words
immediately. However, Grotius did not share this view. His opinion was that
such revocation would be considered an act contrary to good faith, even
although it did not violate another’s right.
Hugo de Groot, De iure belli ac pacis, Lib. II, cap. xi, § 18 [2]
If another, to whom the promise was not made, accepts the promise without
any mandate to do so, but with the promisor’s approval, the effect will be that
the promisor is not allowed to revoke his promise before he, to whom the
promise is addressed, has ratified or nullified it, in such a way that in the
meantime he who accepted the promise, cannot remit it, because the promise
Müller, Die Entwicklung 83 notes 54 and 55. Also some Spanish authors maintained
that the absent beneficiary stipulates through an intermediary, his servant (minister),
if the latter stipulated: do you promise Titius (the beneficiary who was absent) or me to
give? Cf. Gómez, Variae resolutiones, II, cap. XI, nr. 20 (249-250) and Gutiérrez,
Practicarum quaestionum civilium liber III, IV & V, Lib. V, quaestio 97. nr. 8 (304).
92 Although the promise is formulated as ‘in eius nomen cui danda est res’, one
should not presume, as did Müller, that the stipulator was acting “in fremdem
Namen”. Moreover, Müller assumed – also erroneously – that Grotius’ teachings on the
acceptance of a promise worded as addressed to the absent beneficiary, merely referred
to unauthorized representation. Cf. Müller, Die Entwicklung 132. An opinion, similar
to the one of Müller, can be found in Ankum, De voorouders 28 note 97. However,
acceptance of a promise addressed to another, may also refer, at least in the fragment
of Grotius as discussed, to cases we would nowadays qualify as contract in favour of a
third person. Grotius merely indicated that ‘parties’ (i.e. promisor and stipulator)
agreed, that one of them promised that something be given to a third person (the
absent beneficiary). It could well be that both parties were aware of the fact that the
stipulator was acting without any mandate. At the apportionment of an estate the
heirs, for example two brothers, could agree that one of them would pay annually a
certain amount to their sisters. This example is derived from contemporary case law of
the Supreme Court of Holland. Cf. E.M. Meijers e.a. (eds), Cornelis van Bijnkershoek,
Observationes Tumultuariae, III (Haarlem 1946), nr. 2792 (569).
93 Again except for the case the stipulator was the beneficiary’s son or slave, the
actor municipum of the municipium, etc.
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is used here not in order to acquire a right, but in order to bind the promisor
to keep his word regarding granting a benefit, so that if the promisor himself
revoked his promise, he would be acting contrary to good faith94.
What is the effect of accepting, without any mandate to do so, the
promise (worded as addressed) to a third party? As stated above, if there was
a mandate to accept, acceptance by the intermediary resulted in a right for
the third party. Through acceptance without a mandate, however, no one
acquired a right. The beneficiary did not, because he had not yet ratified the
stipulator’s act, the stipulator did not, because the promise was not made to
him. And yet the promisor was no longer entitled to revoke the promise to the
absent beneficiary, while the stipulator could not release him from this
promise. Grotius explained this situation by emphasizing that the agreement
between promisor and intermediary was not aimed at granting the stipulator
a right of his own, but to secure that the promisor would abide by his word95.
The situation was quite different when the promise was not worded as
addressed to the beneficiary, but as made to the stipulator (the first category
mentioned by Grotius)96. If the stipulator was promised that something would
be given to an absent beneficiary97, the stipulator acquired, according to
Grotius, a ius efficiendi ut ad alterum ius perueniat, si et is acceptet and this
even if he himself had no financial interest in the performance. In this
situation the stipulator was able to release the promisor from his promise98.
94 Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis, Lib. II, cap. xi, § 18 [2] (338): “Deficiente autem
mandato, si alius cui promissio facta non est acceptet uolente promissore, tunc erit
effectus, ut promissori reuocare promissionem non liceat antequam is quem spectat
promissio eam ratam habuerit aut irritam: sic tamen ut medio illo tempore is qui
acceptauit remittere promissum non possit, quia hic non adhibitus est ad ius aliquod
accipiendum, sed ad adstringendam promissoris fidem in sustentando beneficio: ita ut
promissor ipse, si reuocet faciat contra fidem, non contra ius proprium alicuius”.
95 To a certain extent this situation is comparable to the pollicitatio, since the
promise is binding, but cannot be enforced.
96 Grotius dealt with this case in De iure belli ac pacis, Lib. II, cap. xi, § 18 [1] (337-
338).
97 In a note Grotius referred to Covarruvias, Relectio c. Quamvis de pact., pars 2, §
IV, nr. 13. Apparently he has in mind the following fragment from nr. 13 (293):
“Quandoque stipulatio concipitur simpliciter uerbis principalibus directis in personam
stipulantis hunc in modum: Promittis mihi dare Titio centum? (...) Deinde in praedictis
iuris ciuilis responsis, maxime in d. l. Stipulatio ista § Alteri (D. 45.1.38.17) et in d. §
Alteri de inutil. stipul. (Inst. 3.19.19) haec stipulatio improbatur eo, quod ipsius
stipulantis nihil intersit, non autem ex defectu formulae conceptae. Qua ratione foret
reprobanda, si uerba ipsius promissionis non dirigerentur in praesentem”.
98 Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis, Lib. II, cap. xi, § 18 [1] (337): “Si mihi facta est
promissio, omissa inspectione an mea priuatim intersit, quam introduxit ius
Romanum, naturaliter uidetur mihi acceptanti ius dari efficiendi, ut ad alterum ius
perueniat, si et is acceptet: ita ut medio tempore a promissore promissio reuocari non
possit; sed ego cui facta est promissio eam possim remittere”.
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An explanation as to why the stipulator could do this, is lacking, but obviously
this had to do with the fact that, since the promise was made to him, he
acquired the right “to bring it about that the beneficiary obtained a right, if
the latter also accepted”. According to the literature the right here acquired
by the stipulator was the right to claim performance of what was promised for
the third party99. In such an interpretation, the doctrine of Grotius was in
conformity with the ius commune, which acknowledged that, as long as the
stipulator had a financial interest in the performance, he had a claim which
he could ‘assign’ to the beneficiary, provided he had stipulated: do you promise
me, to give to Titius?
One may, however, ask whether the ius efficiendi ut ad alterum ius
perueniat si et is acceptet was indeed meant to indicate such a claim. The text
itself does not offer any clues. It is striking that Grotius did not use the word
‘assignment’ (cedere, cessio), whereas all late-scholastic authors did. It is clear,
though, that Grotius followed the canonists, by explicitly dropping the
requirement that the stipulator should have a financial interest in the
performance for the third party. In the ius commune this requirement existed,
because it was useless to stipulate something, which, for lack of interest, could
not be enforced. The fact that in Grotius’ doctrine there was no longer room
for this requirement, might indicate, that the right acquired by the third
party was something quite other than a remedy ‘assigned’ to him by the
stipulator. An intermediary without financial interest acquired no claim, and
one who had no claim at his disposal, could not allow another to enforce this
claim. Furthermore the corresponding fragment in Grotius’ Inleidinge tot de
Hollandsche Rechts-Geleerdheid, which was composed a few year earlier
(between 1619 and 1621), points in this direction. The third party did not
derive his claim from an ‘assignment’ by the stipulator. It was the act between
parties, the promisor and the stipulator, which resulted in a promise to the
third party which he might accept100.
(iii) The modus attached to a promise as an example of contracting in favour
of a third party
Grotius argued that where someone had promised his party to the
contract to give something or to do something, the promisor was entitled to
99 Cf. Ankum, De voorouders 29 and Müller, Die Entwicklung 128: “Durch die
Annahme eines Versprechens im eigenen Namen für einen anderen, erwarb nach
Grotius der Annehmende das Recht zu verlangen, daß an den Dritten geleistet werde”.
100 Inleidinge, Boek III, deel III, § 38 (213): “(...) Maer alzoo by ons meer werd
gezien op de billickheid, als op scherpheid van rechten, zoude oock buiten deze
uitzonderingen een derde de toezegginge moghen aenneemen, ende alzoo recht
bekoomen; ten waer den toezeggher voor de aenneeming van de derde zulcks hadde
wederroepen”.
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attach a modus (restriction) to his promise until the moment it was accepted
by the other. According to Grotius, this followed from the cases he discussed
above101. The attached modus to the promise, could also be revoked102. If the
attached modus would benefit the third party, it could no longer be revoked
from the moment the beneficiary had accepted it.
Hugo de Groot, De iure belli ac pacis, Lib. II, cap. xi, § 19
The modus in favour of a third party, attached to the promise, can be revoked,
as long as it is not yet accepted by the third party103.
Here Grotius dealt with a problem, which in the ius commune was
specifically discussed in connection with a modus attached to donations. Until
which moment could the promisor attach as a condition a certain performance
in return (e.g. that after a lapse of time the donated object be given to a third
party)? Could he revoke this modus? The three persons involved will be
identified as follows: the donor (instead of the general term promisor), the
donee, and the beneficiary, i.e. the one who benefited by the modus attached
to the promise to donate.
Obviously Grotius regarded the modus as a promise by the donor to give
something to the absent beneficiary. He did not specify exactly how this
promise was to be formulated, but in view of the context it had to be a promise
(worded as addressed) to the beneficiary, who at that moment was absent.
Thus there was nobody present to accept the donor’s promise at the moment it
was made, for although the donee was present, he could not be presumed to
101 Until acceptance by the party himself or by an intermediary on his behalf. Cf.
Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis, Lib. 2, cap. xi, § 19 (338): “Ex superioribus intelligi
potest, quid sentiendum sit de onere adiecto promissioni. id enim fieri poterit quamdiu
promissio completa nondum est per acceptationem, nec fide interposita facta
irrevocabilis”. In the legal practice of Holland this was the same for promises to grant
a donation, as appears from Grotius, Inleidinge, Boek III, deel II, § 2 (203).
102 It was also possible to revoke the modus, attached as a condition to the promise,
after the promise had been accepted by the other party. By such revocation the latter
was relieved from an obligation to the beneficiary (the third). Some later authors were
of the opinion that it is also possible that the other party himself had an interest that
the obligation, resulting from the modus, is nevertheless performed. For such a
situation, some maintained that revocation was only possible if the other party
consented. An argument against this opinion would be, however, that the other party
was under all circumstances free to perform voluntarily. In such a case a donation took
place, at any rate when the beneficiary was willing to accept. Grotius did not deal with
such problems.
103 Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis, Lib. II, cap. xi, § 19 (338): “(...) Onus autem in
commodum tertii adiectum promissioni reuocari poterit, quamdiu a tertio acceptatum
non erit.” In a note Grotius referred to C. 8.54.4 and the commentary of Bartolus on D.
45.1.122.2.
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have accepted this promise in favour of the absent beneficiary104. As stated
above, it was disputed whether the modus in favour of a third party, which
the donor had attached to his promise to donate, could be revoked. Following
Covarruvias, Grotius considered the modus, attached to a gift105, to be an
example of a promise (by the donor), which the beneficiary had to accept. As a
consequence of such acceptance, the modus, as any promise, could no longer
be revoked. In the Inleidinge, where he dealt with the modus attached to the
donation itself, Grotius reached the same conclusion. This time he added that
the situation is quite different, if a notary had accepted the modus. As stated
above, it had for centuries been the practice in continental Europe to insert
the modus in instruments of donation in the form of a stipulation, by which
the notary accepted the promise, i.e. the modus, for the beneficiary. A
mandate to accept was in many cases lacking, e.g. when the modus was
attached in favour of an unborn child. However, the notary was capable of
accepting the promise (toezegging) at his own discretion (op sijn welbehagen),
as Grotius expressed it106.
In secondary literature it is argued that in such passages Grotius was
acknowledging the contract in favour of a third party in its modern sense107,
but this does not follow from the fragment from De iure belli ac pacis as
discussed above. Grotius only saw a certain analogy between, on the one
hand, the modus attached to a donation and, on the other, the promise to an
104 For this reason Müller erroneously concluded (Die Entwicklung 130): “Mit dieser
Konstruktion war es Grotius gelungen die in dem Dreiecksverhältnis zwischen
Versprechendem, Versprechensempfanger und Dritten bestehenden Rechte und
Pflichte aufzuzeigen”. Three persons are involved: donor, donee and beneficiary, but it
cannot be maintained that the donee accepted the modus for the beneficiary. The
donor was the “Versprechende”, the beneficiary was the “Dritte”, but the donee was
not the “Versprechensempfanger”. If that would be the case, we should conclude that
the promisor is no longer capable of revoking. If there was indeed someone who
accepted at the moment the modus was attached to the promise, as maintained by
Müller, the donor would no longer be entitled to revoke. Which phrasing was used for
the promise (‘mihi’ or ‘in eius nomen collata cui danda est res’), would not matter.
105 This contract – as stated, Grotius did not confine himself to donation – could be
concluded through an intermediary. The modus could be attached, as Grotius argued,
“quamdiu promissio completa nondum est per acceptationem, nec fide interposita facta
irreuocabilis” (De iure belli ac pacis, Lib. II, cap. xi, § 19, 338). In view of the context,
‘acceptatio’ refers to acceptance by the donee himself or by another on his authority.
‘Fide interposita’ refers to acceptance by someone acting without mandate.
106 Inleidinge, Boek III, deel II, § 12 (205): “Schenckinge (volghens het gunt hier
vooren in ‘t gemeen van toezegging is gezeit) vereischt aevaerdinghe, de welcke (...)
Kan oock geschieden tusschen afwezende door brieven: als oock door gemachtigden
van weder-zijde, welverstaende dat voor de aenvaerding des toezeggers last geen voort-
gang en heeft, indien hy die wederroept ofte te vooren komt te sterven: ten waer een
beampte-schrijver de toezegging voor een ander hadde aengevaert op sijn wel-
behagen”.
107 Cf. Ankum, De Voorouders 28; Müller, Die Entwicklung 130.
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absent beneficiary. Only in the Inleidinge did he discuss the case, where
someone other than the beneficiary, viz. the notary, had accepted the modus
at the moment the donation was incorporated in an instrument. He restricted
himself to the problem whether or not the modus could be revoked.
Grotius did not deal with the question, why in this case the beneficiary
had an action against the donee [!] in order to enforce compliance of the
modus. In later times it was argued that the donee would have made a
promise, which had been accepted by the donor (or by the notary). This
explanation may be in agreement with Grotius’ line of reasoning, but was not
yet explicitly stated.
9. Conclusions
The ley ‘Paresciendo’ is not only relevant for the historical development of
our modern concept of contract, but also for the development of what
nowadays is termed contract in favour of a third party. The introduction of the
ley ‘Paresciendo’ in Castile implied that, in conformity with canon law, the
nude pact (nudum pactum) was acknowledged as a source of obligation.
Moreover, some sixteenth century scholars derived from the text of the ley
“Paresciendo’ evidence that even a unilateral promise resulted in an
enforceable obligation, at any rate if the circumstances of the case showed
that the promisor had intended that his statement would have such a
consequence. The authors who defended this view, viz. that the unilateral
promise can be the source of enforceable obligations, admitted that in this
respect the law of Castile deviated not only from Roman law, but also from
canon law.
The acknowledgment of the nudum pactum as a source of obligation
implied that parties no longer had to come together in order to conclude the
contract. As a consequence, the promise (promissio) by letter or messenger,
addressed to someone absent, which in Roman law was ineffective unless it
was used to express a wish to enter into one of the four consensual contracts,
acquired the character of an offer which could also be accepted after a certain
lapse of time. A second consequence existed in the fact, that the beneficiary
could also accept the promise, offered to him by the promisor, but initiated by
someone else. In terms of the ius commune, the latter case involved a
stipulatio alteri, a stipulation that something be given to another, i.e. an
absent beneficiary.
Obviously the Castilian lawgiver realized, that, acknowledging the
pactum nudum as a source of obligation and accepting the possibility of
concluding a contract inter absentes, had important repercussions on the
Roman law defences which in the ius commune the promisor could still derive
from the maxim alteri stipulari nemo potest. This was considered to
encompass the principle that no rights could be acquired through an
extraneus, i.e. someone not being a son under paternal control. If the
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beneficiary was entitled to accept the promise that something would be given
to him at a later date, it was for the promisor pointless to object that it had
previously been accepted by an extraneus, who according to the ius commune
lacked the authority to accept on his behalf. Similarly, it would be pointless to
bring as a defence that the stipulator, i.e. the one who initiated the promise,
and the beneficiary were not one and the same person. Thus, both defences
were explicitly excluded.
The ley ‘Paresciendo’ did not pronounce upon the question whether the
beneficiary had to accept the promise in order to render it enforceable. This
allowed the sixteenth century scholars to dispute what exactly constituted the
source of obligation. Was it the (unilateral) promise itself, the stipulatio alteri
between stipulator and promisor, or the pact between promisor and
beneficiary once the latter had accepted it? The importance of the ley
‘Paresciendo’ for the development of our modern concept of agency lies
specifically in the fact that this provision caused the Spanish moral
theologians to deal with the precise consequences of a promise. Which
promises could be revoked? Which promises were enforceable?
In the ius commune this question had been less pressing, since only in
exceptional cases did the stipulation that something be given to another have
the effect that the third party acquired a claim. The opinion of the early
glossator Martinus that the beneficiary “in cuius persona (pactum) conceptum
est” always had an action, had, from the twelfth century, been rejected by all
other civilians. The question, whether promises could be enforced by absent
beneficiaries, simply did not occur.
In order to find an answer Antonio Gómez drew a distinction between
promises (worded as addressed) to the absent beneficiary and promises to the
present stipulator. Both kinds of promises were accepted by the stipulator,
but in the first category an obligation came into being between the promisor
and the beneficiary, in the second category between the promisor and the
stipulator. In later times Grotius employed the same distinction. Dealing with
Natural Law in his De iure belli ac pacis, he distinguished between the
promissio in nomen eius collata cui danda est res and the promissio mihi data.
In this distinction, derived from Gómez, Grotius incorporated the teachings of
Covarruvias concerning the revocability of promises. Covarruvias saw an
analogy between the way the stipulatio alteri was embodied in the ley
‘Paresciendo’ and what was prescribed in C. 8.54(55).3 concerning the
donation under a modus. Building on arguments derived from the
commentators’ discussion concerning the revocability of the modus, he came
to the conclusion that the promissio can be revoked until the moment it was
accepted by the beneficiary, unless it had previously been accepted by
someone else, i.e. the stipulator. Grotius appears to derive elements for his
theory on the stipulatio alteri both from Gómez and Covarruvias. Following
Antonio Gómez he maintained, that verba promissoria may contain the name
of the beneficiary. Surely, it is possible to stipulate: do you promise Titius to
give him? From Covarruvias Grotius derived the idea that promises become
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irrevocable, as soon as they are accepted by someone other than the
beneficiary.
By drawing a distinction within the category of promises (worded as
addressed) to the absent beneficiary, viz. between situations where the
stipulator acted with and situations where the stipulator acted without a
mandate, the modern concept of agency becomes apparent. The commentators
and the moral theologians of Spanish late scholasticism had only offered some
starting points for developing this concept. The final step was made in
Grotius’ De iure belli ac pacis. If the stipulator acted with a mandate to accept
the promise for the beneficiary, the latter, being his principal, acquired a
claim. This also applied to the one in the care of a tutor or curator. Acceptance
by the stipulator is regarded as acceptance by the beneficiary. This view of
Grotius constitutes the basis of our modern concept of direct representation108.
108 Unfortunately secondary literature has not adequately recognized that Grotius
made no distinction between acceptance ‘in name of the third’ and acceptance ‘in one’s
own name’. Consequently, it may erroneously seem that Grotius already acknowledged
the modern concepts of unauthorized representation and contracts in favour of a third
party.
